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ABSTRACT
This paper is intended to analyze the contributions of Contextual Theology and
Contextual theologians to dismantling the South African apartheid system. It is intended to
demonstrate that the South African churches failed to effectively politicize and radicalize to
confront the government until the advent of Contextual Theology in South Africa. Contextual
Theology provided the Christian clergy the theological justification to unite with anti-apartheid
organizations. Its very concept of working with the poor and oppressed helped the churches gain
favor with the black masses that were mostly Christian. Its borrowing from Marxist philosophy
appealed to anti-apartheid organizations. Additionally, Contextual theologians, who were
primarily black, began filling prominent leadership roles in their churches and within the
ecumenical organizations. They were mainly responsible for radicalizing the churches and the
ecumenical organizations. They also filled an important anti-apartheid political leadership
vacuum when most political leaders were banned, jailed, or killed.
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INTRODUCTION
South African apartheid was not only a political system; it was also a religious system. 1
Apartheid incorporated both political and theological ideology and practices to achieve social
and economic gains for its white minority population. Although much is documented regarding
the political rise and fall of apartheid South Africa in historiographical scholarship, little
attention is paid to the theological dimension that both contributed to and dismantled the
segregationist government system.2 Although it is true that talented individuals such as the
immensely popular Nelson Mandela and his African National Congress (ANC), as well as trade
unions,3 played instrumental roles in abolishing apartheid, it is equally true that the churches
greatly influenced the final outcome of South Africa's political and social oppressive system. Of
course, political and economic factors were always in play, but religion and moral authority
mattered.
Contextual Theology provided the hermeneutical reasoning, moral force, and prophetic
mandate required to confront and dismantle the apartheid system. Contextual Theology is usually
referred to as “prophetic theology” because it depends upon biblical “exegesis” – or critical
interpretation – and places its emphasis on the biblical themes of liberation and the prophets’
teachings. The biblical prophets appeared in times of social, spiritual, and political turmoil. In
1

Peter Walshe, “Prophetic Christianity and the Liberation Movement,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 39,
no. 1 (1991): 1. Walshe, in his opening sentence, contends that the struggle against apartheid was both theological
and political.
2
Tristan Anne Borer, Challenging the State: Churches as Political Actors in South Africa, 1980-1994. (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), xiii.
3
John Allen, Rabble-Rouser For Peace: The Authorized Biography of Desmond Tutu (NY: Free Press, 2006), 233.
Journalist John Allen contends that although the churches provided “an unrivaled array of platforms at a time when
few others were available in the black community” in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, trade unions “became more
a powerful institutional force for liberation than church denominational structures.” However, he contends that
Desmond Tutu, a Contextual theologian, “made a powerful and unique contribution to publicizing the anti-apartheid
struggle abroad…”
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this regard, Contextual Theology also studies the current times with regard to the gospel
teachings. Therefore, “the gospel becomes contextualized in an attempt to understand its
meaning in the situation of crisis and conflict.”4 These understandings of biblical exegesis led
late twentieth-century Liberation theologians in Latin America and Contextual theologians in
South Africa to focus on the conditions of the poor and oppressed, and attempt to remove all
social and economic barriers that are deemed oppressive. This theology became a significant
driving force used by mostly non-white influential religious leaders and activist theologians to
help end the apartheid government.5
Although the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) and its theology contributed
substantially to the government’s apartheid policies, its non-white mission or “sister” churches
together with many English-speaking – former English missionary – churches helped dismantle
the apartheid system.6 Many times working with anti-apartheid political groups, foreign nations,
and international organizations, the churches fought a two front war against the South African
government – one religious and the other political. Ecclesiastical forces played no small role to
end apartheid.
Before delving further into this work, note that certain words and terms are spelled
according to the South African English spelling, such as Coloured instead of Colored and Labour

4

Tristan Anne Borer, Challenging the State: Churches as Political Actors in South Africa, 1980-1994 (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 100.
5
J. David Turner, An Introduction to Liberation Theology (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), 1. See
also, Nelson Mandela, Nelson Mandela: In His Own Words, ed. Kader Asmal, David Chidester, and Wilmot James
(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2003), 321.
6
Jacobus Christoff Pauw, “Anti-apartheid theology in the Dutch Reformed Family of Churches: a DepthHermeneutical Analysis,” (PhD diss., VU Amsterdam, 2007) 59,
http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/1871/10880/4/7757.pdf (accessed February 22, 2010). The DRC and its “younger,”
“daughter,” or “sister” churches constituted the Dutch Reformed family of churches. Examples of other churches in
the Reformed tradition that opposed apartheid were the Presbyterian Church, Congregational Church, Methodist
Church, and Anglican Church.
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Party instead of Labor Party. For the purpose of clarification, five terms are defined: First,
Contextual Theology is considered the equivalent or near equivalent meaning of Liberation
Theology in South Africa. Therefore, Liberation Theology and Contextual Theology will be used
interchangeably, particularly within the early part of this thesis, unless otherwise noted. Second,
apartheid is Afrikaans for “apartness.” It was first coined in the 1930s and used as a slogan in the
1940s by the National Party. After that party’s victory in the South African 1948 general
elections, the social customs of apartheid were codified into law.7
Third, the apartheid government tended to separate the races by color and shades of color.
Coloureds, for example, were considered having a lighter skin tone than blacks and of mixed
race origin. However, Coloureds suffered the same oppression as blacks. For simplicity, blacks
will mean black and Coloured people of South Africa unless otherwise noted. Fourth, the
“liberation movement,” “freedom struggle,” or “liberation struggle” is typically defined by this
author as political organizations, student groups, trade unions, and other secular anti-apartheid
groups that directly confronted the South African government. In the 1980s, many churches and
ecumenical organizations joined or supported the liberation struggle and they too became part of
this group. Finally, the “prophetic church,” in relation to prophetic theology, as mentioned above,
refers to the churches and Christian ecumenical organizations that taught or implemented the
concepts of Contextual Theology.

Historiography
An examination of the recent historical scholarship is appropriate before beginning to

7

“Africa,” http://www.africanaencyclopedia.com/apartheid/apartheid.html (accessed March 22, 2012).
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explore the topic at hand. Although most of the historical analysis involving the church struggle
in apartheid South Africa is over a decade old, a number of these works are significant to this
thesis. A brief discussion of some of those works follows.
Richard Elphick’s 1997 article, “The Benevolent Empire and the Social Gospel:
Missionaries and South African Christians in the Age of Segregation,” states that early twentiethcentury Social Gospel Christians sought to alleviate Africans of oppressive social and cultural
policies by implementing British and American Social Gospel ideas. South African Social
Christianity, the equivalent of Social Gospel in the industrial nations, made a significant impact
on South African Christianity. However, most white liberal and black South Africans, impressed
by the self-help teachings of African American Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee Normal and
Industrial Institute, rejected the Western industrial “socialist” model and adopted an elitist and
paternalistic ideology to seek black African liberation. They believed that the South African
racial problems would be resolved through dialogue and understanding among men of reason.
This “Tuskegee” model collapsed primarily for two reasons. First, the masses, mostly poorly
educated, could not relate to the elitists. Second, the South African government removed any
chances of blacks becoming full citizens in 1948, therefore eliminating the means for black selfdetermination.8 Only too late did the Social Christians come to understand that they needed to
work “with” and not “for” the oppressed Africans.
Elphick provides a nuanced look at the Social Gospel and Social Christianity concepts.
However, there were clear distinctions between black rural and urban Christians. Elphick does

8

Richard Elphick, “The Benevolent Empire and the Social Gospel: Missionaries and South African Christians in the
Age of Segregation,” in Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social, and Cultural History, ed. Richard Elphick
and Rodney Davenport (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 366.
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not discuss these two groups with regard to accepting any form of Social Christianity. Also,
South Africa’s Social Christianity, by definition, is equivalent to the Western Social Gospel.
However, the South African version took on a more moderate tone in its social activism,
preferring to work with the paternalists instead of outright protesting against the government.
The more confrontational industrial “socialist” model of the Social Gospel is discarded for the
more subdued “Tuskegee” model. However, Elphick does not provide much information on the
socialist model, nor does he provide sufficient comparison between the Tuskegee and the
socialist model in order for the reader to understand why one model was preferable to the other.
On the other hand, Peter Walshe’s 1997 “Christianity and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle:
The Prophetic Voice within Divided Churches,” states that twentieth-century South African
Liberation theologians changed their former tactics of “noblesse oblige” or working “for” the
disenfranchised – what the Tuskegee method promoted – to working “with” them – what the
socialist method promoted in the form of Liberation Theology. Walshe argues that once prophetic
Christianity challenged the South African churches’ status quo toward the apartheid system, “the
Christian church itself became a site of political struggle.” Walshe provides the reader with an
evolution of South African prophetic Christianity from the turn of the twentieth century to the
early 1990s, claiming that it became more politicized through the years. At the height of its
activism in the 1980s, Walshe states that prophetic Christian leaders worked for ecumenical
collaboration and joined the anti-apartheid political movement in order to end apartheid. 9
Walshe clearly provides the reader with a better understanding of the churches’ role in the

9

Peter Walshe, “Christianity and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle: The Prophetic Voice within Divided Churches,” in
Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social, and Cultural History, ed. Richard Elphick and Rodney Davenport
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 383, 387, 398.
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anti-apartheid struggle. However, Walshe assumes that the reader understands the meaning of the
“prophetic church.” It is not clear at first how the word “prophetic” relates to Liberation
Theology. For many Christians, prophesy and prophetic signify the biblical end times. This is
clearly not what prophetic means to liberal Christians. A basic introduction of biblical themes,
such as the significance of prophets in the bible, and what the prophetic teachings meant for
Liberation Theologians of the 1970s and 1980s could clear any possible misinterpretations.
John W. De Gruchy’s 1997 “Grappling with a Colonial Heritage: The English-speaking
Churches under Imperialism and Apartheid” relates very closely to Peter Walshe’s analysis. De
Gruchy, however, begins with the origins of the English-speaking churches – most which
eventually became the prophetic churches – from the nineteenth century with the arrival of the
British to South Africa. De Gruchy states that the English-speaking churches originally shared
the South African’s segregationist policies in the early 1900s. By the mid-twentieth-century,
however, cracks between the English-speaking churches and the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed
Church began to show as apartheid ideology and policy increased. Although de Gruchy states
that the English-speaking churches condemned apartheid policies, at least in principle, and
passed resolutions against such policies, they failed to implement their resolutions.10
To his credit, de Gruchy provides the reader with a good understanding of the origins of
English-speaking or South African prophetic churches. The evolution of the English-speaking
churches and their relationship with the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church are clearly
discernable. Nevertheless, de Gruchy’s article states that the Contextual Theologians filled a

10

John W. de Gruchy, “Grappling with a Colonial Heritage: The English-speaking Churches under Imperialism and
Apartheid,” in Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social, and Cultural History, ed. Richard Elphick and
Rodney Davenport (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 155 – 6, 160.
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crucial political leadership vacuum without providing much analysis as to how the vacuum
occurred in the first place.
Similar to Walshe and de Gruchy, Tristan Anne Borer’s 1998 Challenging the State:
Churches as Political Actors in South Africa emphasizes the role of the churches in confronting
the apartheid state. She argues that the churches became “overtly political actors” through at least
three factors. First, the state’s intensified repression and the opposition’s increased militancy
changed the political environment. Second, the rise of new theology contributed to the churches’
inclusion of certain discourse previously considered beyond the religious sphere. Finally, the
nature of political discourse within the churches’ institutional framework contributed to their
level of politicization. As an example, Borer states that in 1983, the South African government
reacted to church leaders’ increased condemnation of apartheid by often harassing church
workers. She adds that, “The ensuing church / state conflict further contributed to the
politicization of leaders and their organizations.” This coupled with the increased role of the
church leadership in the liberation movement and within the ecumenical organizations “led to
spiraling involvement of the [ecumenical organizations] in the political realm.”11
Borer’s monograph provides a detailed account of the Protestant English-speaking
churches’ and the Roman Catholic Churches’ involvement in the South African anti-apartheid
struggle, as well as Contextual Theology’s impact on the radicalization of the churches and their
ecumenical organizations. However, her scope of research includes the years between 1980 and
1994. Borer’s work neglects to elaborate how the anti-apartheid political vacuum occurred in the
late 1970s. Also, Borer’s book provides a concise but well written description on Contextual

11

Borer, xvii, 56.
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Theology. Nevertheless, there is a missing component. Although, Marxism is central to the
character of Contextual Theology, there is no direct mention or thorough discussion of the
influence of Marxist ideology on Contextual Theology.
Another work of significant interest regarding church and state affairs revolving around
apartheid is Jacobus Christoff Pauw’s 2007 dissertation, “Anti-Apartheid Theology in the Dutch
Reformed Family of Churches: a Depth-Hermeneutical Analysis,” which provides one of the few
in-depth analyses of the history of the DRC as it relates to the South African apartheid era. Pauw
provides a detailed account of the DRC’s theology and evolution that led to its adoption of
segregationist beliefs. Pauw provides thorough analysis on the role that anti-apartheid Dutch
Reformed members played in helping dismantle the DRC’s apartheid beliefs. For example,
Contextual theologian and former DRC member Rev. C.F. Beyers Naude had been a member of
the Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood) since graduating from religious studies at Stellenbosch
University. His father had been one of the Broederbond’s first founders and its first president in
1918. The Broederbond was a secret society that organized the Afrikaner power base through its
members in the government, military, police, civil service, business establishment, media, and
the DRC. Naude’s pedigree and credentials pointed to a future of power and prestige in white
South Africa.12
However, he started to question apartheid as his theological knowledge and real world
experience broadened. The writings of European theologians during the Nazi era influenced him
greatly. Naude found it increasingly difficult to biblically justify apartheid when asked about it
during his overseas tours to Europe and North America. In his native South Africa, young DRC

12

Pauw, 144. See also, Walshe, “Anti-Apartheid Struggle,” 386.
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ministers encouraged Naude to go with them to Indian townships, black mining compounds, and
Coloured slum areas. Through his own eyes, Naude witnessed the tragic results of apartheid
policy.13 Eventually, Naude left the Broederbond to support the church’s anti-apartheid struggle.
He and his Christian Institute played a crucial role in introducing Contextual Theology to the
South African churches.
From the beginning of Dutch settlement in South Africa to the fall of apartheid four
hundred years later, Pauw provides one of the most thorough analyses of the DRC’s contribution
in conceiving religious apartheid as well as its eventual rejection of it. Also, Pauw masterfully
presents a thorough account of the anti-apartheid struggle from the DRC’s and its sister churches’
perspectives that many other scholars leave out. Due to this focus, Pauw’s analysis of Contextual
Theology’s contribution to the liberation struggle is not as in-depth.
Another work of interest is J. David Turner’s 1994 monograph, An Introduction to
Liberation Theology. Turner states that the Catholic Church, in Vatican II, opened the way for
more Latin American church leaders to participate in major Catholic conferences. However, not
until the Medellin Conference of 1968 did the Latin American church leaders establish welldefined liberation ideas.14 One of those ideas is that the struggle for socio-economic equality is
central to Liberation theology. However, Turner is not one to give praise to either the concept or
practice of Liberation Theology.
He believes that Liberation Theology’s adoption of socialist theory hinders its ability to
be an effective means of economic improvement for the poor. He contends that Liberation
theologians should avoid Marxist methodologies for changing the socio-economic order in
13
14

Pauw, 145-9.
Turner, 3, 7.
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capitalist structured nations given the grand failure of previously attempted socialist experiments
in many of those countries.15 Turner, however, neglects to provide any counter argument to the
successes of Black Theology – a variant of Liberation Theology – during the Civil Rights
movement in the United States. Leonardo and Clodovis Boff’s 1986 seminal work, Introducing
Liberation Theology, clearly states Liberation Theology's position on Marxism, which is similar
to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s stance – King’s view is briefly discussed later in this paper.
The Boff’s assert that the theology requires Marxism to submit “to the judgment of the
poor and their cause, and not the other way around.” In other words, Marxism is only used as an
instrument for the sake of the poor. Liberation theology “freely borrows” from Marxist
methodology, but it does not exalt Marxist theory over gospel teachings. It holds a “decidedly
critical” position in relation to Marxism and rejects its unchristian attributes, such as materialism.
The Boffs stress that Liberation Theology also seeks to go “beyond socialism as it exists
today.”16 From Turner’s vantage point in 1994, socialism failed to produce the classless society it
promised. However, the Boffs clearly stated that socialism within Liberation Theology was a
means to an end and not the end itself.
Most of the historiographical scholarship presented above focuses on the South African
churches’ role within the anti-apartheid struggle. The historiography discusses Contextual
Theology’s attributes and contributions – in varying degrees – in radicalizing the churches to
confront the state. However, there has been no in-depth scholarly work on the specific
contribution of Contextual Theology to the dismantling of apartheid over the full range of time
15

Ibid., 113.
Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, Introducing Liberation Theology. trans. Paul Burns. (Petropolis, RJ, Brazil:
Editor Voss, 1986; reprint, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2003), 28, 92. (page citations are to the reprint edition).
16
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from the arrival of the Dutch to the beginning of democratic rule.
This is the gap that this thesis intends to fill. This work stresses the importance of
theology in framing political discourse, influencing political policies, and in taking political
action. Contextual Theology’s very nature, which includes Marxist ideology, appealed to the
oppressed and disenfranchised groups in South Africa. Its religious concepts also provided the
theological justification for its South African ecclesiastical leaders to radicalize and join the
liberation struggle. Nevertheless, Contextual Theology was not a result of the inevitable
evolution of liberal theology in South Africa. It was an injection into the South African
theological discourse introduced from foreign influences such as the United States and Latin
America. Prior to the introduction of Contextual Theology in the 1970s, the South African
churches failed to effectively unite with the liberation movement and confront the state.
However, once it did become a popular theology, primarily among the English-speaking clergy
and theologians, it successfully contributed to ending apartheid. This work also provides
evidence of how the filling in of that crucial political leadership gap successfully contributed to
the ending of apartheid through the Contextual theologians’ direct action campaigns on the
domestic front and their diplomatic efforts abroad.
Christianity had not witnessed the degree of political radicalization and ecumenical
cooperation within the prophetic church movement until the last decade of the South African
apartheid era. Therefore, it is the author’s intent that this thesis, although not exhaustive,
provides a comprehensive understanding of apartheid’s history in South Africa and Contextual
Theology’s role in its dismantling. It is also the author’s intent that this work revives further
research of Contextual Theology’s importance and influence in world-wide political crises and
11

social movements.

Outline of Chapters
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter, “Origins of Apartheid,”
explores the background of the Afrikaner religious experience in South Africa, from the arrival
of the early seventeenth century Dutch settlers in Cape Town to their migration, or Great Trek, to
the northern interior during British occupation of South Africa. Afrikaner conflict with British
rule – which eventually led to the late nineteenth-century Anglo-Boer War – ultimately resulted
in the “poor white” dilemma that led to exclusionary policy against non-whites. The chapter also
emphasizes on the similarities and differences between the settler (Afrikaner) churches and the
English-speaking – predominantly European – churches and their treatment of African groups,
such as the Khoikhoi and Xhosa. Also, a brief historiographical analysis is provided on the role
and impact that the churches and their missionary work played in the formation of and resistance
to racist political policy in South Africa, with special attention given to the adoption of
Kuyperian neo-Calvinism Theology in the Afrikaner religious community. This theology is
credited with reinforcing the need to separate the races. The chapter concludes with an analysis
of the Afrikaner National Party’s rise to power with the support of the DRC.
In the second chapter, “Early and Limited Resistance to Apartheid in the Englishspeaking Churches and Anti-Apartheid Political Movements,” the early relationship between the
English-speaking churches and the DRC is discussed. Also, the early anti-apartheid ecclesiastical
movement is represented by Christian ministers Trevor Huddleston and Michael Scott. The anti-

12

apartheid political movement is represented by Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, and Stephen
Biko.
Huddleston described his limited victories in Johannesburg to prevent the humiliating and
oppressive economic and political treatment that non-whites endured during the early years of
the post-1948 National Party election victory. Scott attempted to organize an anti-apartheid
movement with communist allies and fails. In contrast, Geoffrey Clayton helped unite the
English-speaking Protestant and Catholic churches to denounce the apartheid laws, but even after
the Sharpeville Shootings and Cottesloe Consultation, full politicization and radicalization were
still many years away.
In the meantime, the political anti-apartheid movement had major set backs. Devout
Christian and ANC leader, Albert Luthuli pleaded for more church direct action against the
government but only received minor concessions. Nelson Mandela, frustrated with the ANC’s
pace in dismantling apartheid through non-violent means, helped form a militant wing in the
early 1960s. His and his associates’ militant actions resulted in getting them arrested, tried,
convicted, and sentenced to prison for many years. The government also banned the ANC and
other anti-apartheid political organizations.
No substantial anti-apartheid movement continued throughout the mid-1960s until the
rise of Stephen Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). The BCM was heavily
influenced by the Christian clergy. However, Biko’s killing ten years later abruptly ended the
BCM’s powerful anti-apartheid influence in South Africa, leaving yet another anti-apartheid
leadership and organizational vacuum that needed to be filled.

13

The third and final chapter, “The Rise of Contextual Theology and the Fall of Apartheid,”
provides a more detailed background and definition of Contextual Theology. It also addresses the
Belhar Confession – the powerful anti-racist statement of faith influenced greatly by Contextual
theologian Allan Boesak of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church – and the Kairos Document,
influenced predominantly by the Contextual theologians in the English-speaking churches. The
Belhar Confession challenged the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church while the Kairos Document
challenged to the South African government. The implications and actions resulting from the
release of these two official ecclesiastical statements, but particularly the Kairos Document in the
Harare Declaration and also the Lusaka Statement, are addressed. In addition, the growing
radicalization of the South African churches through the efforts of leading Contextual
theologians, such as Desmond Tutu through the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and
Allan Boesak through the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC), is discussed in detail.
During the last years of the apartheid regime, the church leaders became increasingly
vocal and active against the government. They initiated non-violent resistance campaigns at great
risk to their freedom and lives. This chapter chronicles the major events that took place during
the last decade of the apartheid government. It also reveals the strategies and tactics utilized by
the Contextual theologian leaders to dismantle apartheid. It demonstrates that the religious
leaders appealed to and worked with foreign governments for economic sanctions against the
South African government. They allied with anti-apartheid political groups within and outside
the country to apply political pressure against the apartheid regime. The chapter concludes with a
brief example of how Contextual theologians helped transition South Africa from apartheid to
democracy through the National Peace Accord (NPA) in the early 1990s.
14

Ultimately, this thesis argues that theology played as much a key role in the dissolution of
apartheid as in its formation. Not until the introduction of Contextual Theology in the 1970s and
1980s did the South African English-speaking churches and Christian ecumenical institutions
become politicized. Mostly black clergy in influential leadership roles were responsible for this
radicalization. Also, with prominent anti-apartheid political leaders imprisoned, banned, or
killed, and their organizations outlawed, Contextual theologians successfully united with antiapartheid opposition groups, and in many cases took the initiative to lead in the front lines of
protest, and sustained the domestic and international pressure against the apartheid government
until its final dismantling.

15

CHAPTER 1
Origins of Apartheid
In order to understand Contextual Theology’s influence in South African religiosity and
politics, a firm footing must be established in regard to South African history. For it is the
beginning of European history within South Africa and European interaction with, as well as
reaction to indigenous Africans that sets the motion of events that led to dreaded apartheid, and
ultimately its demise. Therefore this chapter begins with the early Dutch Settlement, with its
impact on the indigenous people, and concludes with an analysis of the segregationist National
Party’s rise to power.

Christianity always played an important role in South African history. The Dutch East
India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC) – a subsidiary private organization
under the auspices of the government of the Netherlands – played a major, albeit unintentional,
role in helping establish permanent settlements in South Africa.17 Prior to the building of the
Suez Canal in Egypt in the nineteenth century, the Cape of Good Hope at the tip of Southern
Africa provided the quickest and best trade route to the East. The VOC exploited this opportunity
successfully. In time, the Dutch established permanent settlements in South Africa with the
earliest European settlement established at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652.

17

Pauw, 62. Two important background statements need to be addressed. First, Dutch Calvinism partially developed
out of the struggle from Spanish Catholic domination. In 1651, one year prior to the VOC’s arrival to the Cape, the
Reformed religion became the state religion of the newly liberated Dutch provinces. Second, Pauw contends that
colonization of the Cape was not the original intent of the Dutch government, but evolved through immigration from
European settlers and slaves brought from other Dutch colonies.
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With regard to church-state issues, however, colonial authority claimed direct control
over the affairs of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa. The Dutch East India Company
believed that it was responsible for the protection of the Dutch Reformed Church. In the VOC’s
view, the church helped maintain social cohesion because it demonstrated the holiest example for
the Christian religion.18
Church-state cohesion slightly relaxed under the brief French occupation of South Africa.
France, under Napoleon Bonaparte’s rule, invaded the Netherlands in 1794, forcing Prince
William V to flee to England. William gave the British rule over the Cape of Good Hope in order
to prevent France from colonizing it. This mandate formally ended Dutch rule in South Africa.
Yet, British rule also ended briefly when the 1802 Treaty of Amiens mandated that the Cape be
turned over to French authority – known as the Batavian Republic. During French occupation,
more liberal church reforms took place. For example, the new government allowed the
establishment of different denominations and missionary groups. Full separation of church and
state, however, did not occur. Three years later, a British fleet recaptured the Cape.19 Finally, an
agreement involving England, Holland, and Sweden in 1814 gave the British official control of
South Africa.20 Reestablishment of British rule meant the continuance of church and state
unity.21
Prior to the 1814 British annexation of South Africa, French Huguenots – fleeing
religious persecution in Europe – and Germans joined the Dutch in South Africa. Eventually, the
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groups merged and even developed their own cultural identity and language – Afrikaners and
Afrikaans, respectively. However, after 1814, the British began to settle in the Eastern Cape by
the thousands. These new settlers became a buffer between the contentious Afrikaner farmers
and native Africans. They began to influence both the Afrikaner and African way of life. In time,
the buffer would not be needed because newly implemented British mandates, such as the
abolition of slavery and Ordinance 50 – explained later in this chapter – forced the Afrikaners to
reconsider their location within South Africa. Also, what the Afrikaners considered British liberal
policies involving the treatment of blacks fueled their animosity toward both the English and
Africans. These were just a few of the increasingly unacceptable and unforgivable British
policies that forced many Afrikaners to migrate from the Cape colony to the hinterland. This
exodus is commonly referred to as the Great Trek.22
Near the turn of the twentieth century, the unintentional partitioning of South Africa had
evolved among two groups of European origin – the primarily Dutch Afrikaners and their
English colonizers. The Afrikaners established two independent republics in the hinterland – the
Transvaal in the northern part of the country, and the Orange Free State in the central area. The
British controlled the two coastal provinces – the Cape and Natal.23
The discovery of gold in the Transvaal attracted many British and foreign nationals from
around the world. These foreigners – or Uitlanders as Transvaal President Paul Kruger referred to
them – soon outnumbered the Afrikaners in that republic. Claiming that their work contributed to
generating profits for the Transvaal economy, they also soon began to ask for equal rights and
voting privileges. The British, hoping to acquire a stake in the potential fortune in gold, pressed
22
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Kruger to accept the Uitlanders’ demands. Kruger refused to give any major concessions and in
1899, the simmering impasse boiled over into the bloody conflict known as the Second AngloBoer War.24 The war, lost by the Boers three years later,25 proved disastrous for many Afrikaner
families, leaving many impoverished. The aftermath of the war quickly played into Afrikaner
nationalist and religious sentiments, and produced discriminatory policies against blacks that
eventually evolved into full blown apartheid by 1948. This subject will be discussed in later
pages.
The lack of trained Dutch Reformed ministers after the break between the Cape and
Dutch churches prompted the Cape Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, to recruit Scottish
missionaries from the London Missionary Society (LMS) for DRC ministry in the early 1800s.
Cape colonists of Dutch descent viewed the British governor’s action as a deliberate intent to
replace their language with English and thus ultimately encroach upon their culture. As a result,
many Dutch-speaking colonists decided to leave the Cape. In the meantime, the Cape Church
remained under lessening British state control for two-thirds of the nineteenth century. Not until
1875 did the DRC in the Cape finally receive full independence from state control.26
Although church-state ties ended between England and the DRC, late Victorian-era
policy and practice played a vital part in church-state associations between the government and
the English-speaking mission churches in South Africa during British rule. Historian Wallace G.
Mills points to imperialist J.R. Seeley’s late nineteenth-century monograph, The Expansion of
England, which argues that a national church and the state should be closely linked. Likewise,
24

Ibid., 14-5.
Woods, Asking for Trouble, 22. Boers were descendents of the first Dutch settlers in South Africa. Later they
called themselves Afrikaners.
26
Pauw., 65-6.
25

19

Bishop Westcott – referring to the Second Anglo-Boer War – stated that the British hold their
empire “in the name of Christ.”27 The British Empire often protected Christian missionaries in
Africa. Many missionaries viewed this safeguard as validation of the Christian mission, therefore
inadvertently giving legitimacy to imperial motives. Mills contends that by the turn of the
twentieth century, Christians viewed the British Empire as compatible with their own interests.28
Similarly, South African professor of Christian Studies John W. de Gruchy states that the
English-speaking churches were devoted to England. For example, the English-speaking
churches supported the British during the Anglo-Boer War. Voluntarily or not, they also aided in
the expansion of the empire in South Africa through their missionary societies. De Gruchy
contends that Christianity grew rapidly among the African natives, in large part due to the work
of missionary societies. African organizations such as the South African Native National
Congress (SANNC) – which formed in 1912 and changed its name in 1923 to the African
National Congress (ANC) – adopted the liberal Christian teachings of individual rights and
liberty. The missionaries taught these very merits to their African students. Christian teaching
created for native Africans a “unifying ethical basis for African nationalism.”29

Overview of the Missions’ Influence among Native South Africans
Historians Elizabeth Elbourne and Robert Ross contend that political and religious
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conflict arising out of both Protestant and Catholic Reformations, and religious revivals based on
“millennial expectations” were two salient factors that eventually led to overseas evangelical
missions in the eighteenth century.30 With regard to the eschatological factor, two distinct
predominant theologies began to take form in the Western, and particularly Protestant Christian,
world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One belief, pre-millennialism, became a
staple of conservative church doctrine, while the other, post-millennialism, influenced liberal
church theology – this theology had much in common with the Contextual Theology that
developed in late twentieth-century South Africa. These two eschatological theologies remain in
contention between the conservative and liberal church to this very day. Nevertheless, Historian
Wallace G. Mills argues that the pre-millennialist missionaries unwittingly helped serve imperial
interests by their non-involvement in, and lack of condemnation of, state affairs. Postmillennialists, on the other hand, leaned toward socially progressive causes and an emphasis in
helping society's poor and down-trodden through government intervention, if necessary.31
In early missionary South Africa, however, church and state served Dutch Reformed
interest to eliminate denominational competition and exploit native peoples. For example, the
pastoral Khoikhoi – the first to be encountered by Dutch settlers – were among the earliest native
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people converted to Christianity by German-speaking Moravians. The Moravian missionary,
Georg Schmidt, began his work among the Khoikhoi in 1737.32 However, his successful ministry
and Moravian doctrinal differences with Reformed theology, especially with regard to baptismal
belief and practice, caused his banishment from South Africa.33 In 1743, under pressure from
Dutch Reformed clergy, the VOC deported Schmidt and his mission from South Africa.
Consequently, the Khoikhoi lost most of their livelihood between Schmidt's departure and the
restoration of the Moravian mission in 1792. Many Khoikhoi turned to subsistence farming, but
even after the Moravian return, the Gonaqua Khoikhoi of the Eastern Cape lost most of their
land, herds, and access to water in an unsuccessful rebellion from 1799 to 1802. A large number
of Khoikhoi became servants to white settler farmers.34
Some Khoikhoi – who were at least partly assimilated into western culture and who were
reduced to subsistence living – accepted Christian conversion more easily than other native
groups. The Khoikhoi used Christianity as a form of protection against the exploitation and
oppression by the white settlers. Missionary converts used Christian status to gain some control
over their lives. As an act of rebellion more than an act of religious experience, Khoikhoi
accepted Christianity to defy white Christian settlers – who associated Christians with the white
race, and associated Christianity with political and economic control. Christianity became a
leveler whereby Khoikhoi could claim equality with the whites. Others believed that they and not
the white farmers were the true remnant of the church and therefore the true Christians. The most
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vulnerable of the Khoikhoi asserted that Christ was on their side and would not abandon them.35
Prophetic and bold in claim, South African Liberation theologian clergy – as the Khoikhoi before
them – preached this very message centuries later to their predominantly oppressed black
congregations during the struggle against white supremacist apartheid.
Nevertheless, Christianity also offered material gains apart from social gains and a means
of self worth, particularly outside the colony. Transorangia and Little Namaqualand pastoralists
accepted missionaries for their livestock, trading ties to the colonial interior, technology, and
even missionary connections with whites who could provide Khoikhoi with weapons for raiding
and hunting. The missions also provided mechanical skills that helped serve as a means to avoid
“de facto enserfment” within the colony.36
Established in 1795 and known as the London Missionary Society (LMS) after 1816,37
the LMS provided consistent assistance to native South Africans. The LMS was arguably one of
the most influential missions that contributed to early native South African Christian
conversions, and more importantly to protection of native rights. Interdenominational in policy
but mostly Congregational in nature and direction, the LMS soon followed Moravian
missionaries to South Africa, eventually adopting some of the Moravian evangelizing practices. 38
The Dutch Johannes Theodorus van der Kemp headed the first LMS mission in the Cape
in the early 1800s. Van der Kemp avoided changing Khoikhoi culture. He is quoted as saying
that “all civilization is from the Devil.” This ran in direct opposition to other missionaries who
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wanted the Khoikhoi to become civilized and adopt the practices of an “individualistic capitalist
society.” At the other extreme, white farmers attempted to keep the Khoikhoi under their labor
control and in permanent subsistence farming. At times the farmers employed intimidation of
mission stations, misrepresenting the intent of missionaries, and even violence against the
Khoikhoi in order to force them into farm labor.39
Van der Kemp and his colleague James Read – ironically both pre-millenialists –
obtained some judicial victories for the Khoikhoi who brought grievances against the farmers.
Other LMS missionaries also supported Vander Kemp’s and Read’s initiative. However, not all
LMS missionaries approved of, for example, establishing circuit courts for Khoikhoi complaints.
This made some missionaries uncomfortable with the purpose and intent of the missionary work.
Some complained that Van der Kemp danced too closely with politics instead of civilizing the
natives. According to Elbourne and Ross, the dissenting missionaries feared that the “radical
millenarianism of the first missionaries were being overtaken by a much more quiescent
Christianity, both in Europe and in South Africa.”40
The Scottish minister John Philip became head of the LMS in South Africa in1820. Philip
took an almost opposite approach to Van der Kemp. Philip believed in acculturating the
Khoikhoi in property rights and Western culture. He used this as a political strategy so that the
Khoikhoi could retain their individual rights. His successful demonstration of displaying
westernized Khoikhoi people and villages, and equally successful appeal to British authorities in
London, helped win the Khoikhoi a measure of “freedom and protection.” At the same time,
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Acting Governor Richard Bourke issued Ordinance 50 granting the same rights to all groups
within the Cape, and the LMS viewed this as a major win. The governor’s ordinance allowed the
LMS to keep its promise to the Khoikhoi as long as converts made a profound cultural
transformation. Khoikhoi could now own land, and government no longer implemented de facto
force labor on them. The LMS efforts to attain basic rights for the Khoikhoi – despite his
acculturation methods – only solidified the relationship between the two groups.41
Needless to say, the English-speaking missionaries made their most positive impact on
the African indigenous population by providing “sound education” through church schools and
universities. Archbishop Desmond Tutu – who will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters
– states that the churches greatly contributed to African education. “Had things depended only on
the government, then many [Africans] would have either had no education at all or would have
had to be content with an inferior brew available in the few government institutions set aside for
blacks.”42 The churches – as well as other non-Christian religious institutions and leaders –
educated many of the anti-apartheid leaders that would eventually confront the National Party
government during the height of the apartheid era. In 1999, Nelson Mandela stated in Parliament
that “without the Church, without religious institutions, I would never have been here today.”43
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Ironically, black theologians would teach the churches and their schools about Contextual
Theology, as this theology did not come directly through the church educational system. As will
be discussed later, Contextual Theology evolved out of mid-twentieth-century struggles between
churches and tyrannical governments. In the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth
century, the theology of the DRC remained dominant in South Africa.

The Early DRC and the Formation of the DRC Mission Churches
Although current historiography argues slightly differing opinions on the genesis of
apartheid theology in the DRC,44 its beginning reaches as far back as the early Dutch settlers’
extreme Calvinistic interpretation, known as Covenant Theology. Covenant Theology provided
an explanation for both humanity’s fall into sin and the foundation of all societal relationships.
Yet, doctrinal differences arose among the seventeenth-century Dutch settlers who taught that
children of believers were “externally holy,” or needing conversion in order to receive salvation,
and those who taught that children of believers were already saved at conception, or “internally
holy.” Those who believed in internal holiness regarded all white Europeans and their children as
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saved, and the natives as unsaved. Eventually, the internal holiness doctrine became the
predominant belief in the Dutch settler community.
The large migration of the Dutch community from the Cape to the northern interior –
known as the Great Trek from 1835 to 1846 – played a significant role in the minds and theology
of the early Boers. Hardly any educated theological leadership existed in the frontier wilderness
for nearly two hundred years.45 However, the first Afrikaans writers, and particularly the poets,
portrayed the Boers as a persecuted people delivered to the Promised Land, and which
subsequently faced a “Babylonian captivity at the hands of the British.” These types of biblically
symbolic origin stories helped mold – in time – a prejudicial and white supremacist attitude
within the Afrikaner community.46 The “wellsprings of apartheid” originated in the frontier
Afrikaner churches during the 1850s.47 Indoctrination of social and religious chauvinism did not
appear within the early Dutch settlers of the Cape.
Evidently, the early Cape church had no plans for separate worship based on ethnicity.
The Church Ordinance of 1804 – imposed by the Cape’s commissioner General J.A. De Mist –
declared that all people could worship together in the same church. It was only later in the
nineteenth century that the practice of unified church worship changed with missionary practices
and the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism. Non-whites began to be seated at the back or sides
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of the church. Eventually they were placed in separate buildings altogether.48 Needless to say,
with such exclusionary polity, the DRC – with minor exceptions – did not involve itself
extensively in missionary work.49
The DRC mission churches were actually segregated congregations within the Dutch
Reformed family of churches in South Africa based on skin color and language. Pauw contends
that although, at first, the notion that black and Coloured people should worship separately from
white people was seen as contrary to Christian principle, the DRC church polity changed in favor
of segregation as Afrikaner identification increased. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the
church’s official polity was to allow all members, regardless of their race or ethnicity, to worship
together in the same building. The synod of 1857 officially sanctioned segregation policies. The
church formally subjected black and Coloured congregants to separate Christian teaching
facilities known as a gesticht or “separate building.” 50 Ministry to black and Coloured members
fell under the expertise of white DRC missionaries. Hence, the gestichte eventually became
known as the DRC “mission churches.”51
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DRC mission churches did not develop in the same manner as those formed from the
missionary societies. It is important to note that the policy of gesticht, for instance, did not exist
outside the Cape. The DRC congregations within the Transvaal, Free State, and Natal were
strictly white. In addition, these regions rejected the intervention of missionaries within the DRC
congregations. The reason for the animosity between the congregations and missionaries was due
to the missionary societies’ criticisms of colonist racist policy. Therefore, separate churches for
black and Coloured people outside the Cape were predominantly established by the mission
societies with little involvement from the DRC.52
However, within the Cape itself, the DRC leadership observed an unacceptable amount of
disorganization in the DRC mission churches. Therefore, the white leadership – and not the
Coloured members of the mission churches – drew up a constitution to form its first “daughter”
church for Coloured members. The Dutch Reformed Mission Church (DRMC) originated in
1881. However, Coloured members were not always willing to leave their DRC congregations.
There were instances, such as in Swartland in 1881, where white members forced their Coloured
members to leave their local DRC congregations and move to the newly established DRMC
congregation.53
The DRC primarily left the missionary work of converting the Xhosa – or black people in
the Eastern Cape – to the missionary societies. However, the expansion of DRC congregations –
particularly in the mid-nineteenth century – into black areas resulted in the eventual formation of
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the Dutch Reformed Bantu Church in 1951. The unification of the DRMC of the Orange Free
State, the DRMC of Transvaal, the DRMC of Natal, and the DR Bantu Church established the
Dutch Reformed Church in Africa (DRCA) in 1963.54
The migrant Indian population spent the second half of the nineteenth century suffering
through seclusion and inequality. As a result, Indian Christians held limited contact with the
established churches. A century later, missionaries and evangelists succeeded in forming DRC
congregations with Indian members. By 1962, four Indian DRC congregations united and in
1968, the Indian churches passed a constitution for a separate church from the DRC, and
establishing Indian Reformed Church. In the 1976, its name changed to the Reformed Church in
Africa (RCA).55

The Rise of Religious Apartheid in the Twentieth Century
Around the time of General James Hertzog’s party rise to power in the 1920s, the Dutch
Reformed Church responded to the Afrikaner plight by initiating relief programs. The DRC, for
example, created irrigation settlements for rural white families and bought the crops produced
from those settlements. The church also established boarding houses for poor students and
schools for the speaking-, hearing-, and sight-impaired. The church built orphanages, nursing
homes, and hospitals. It also established social work programs and women’s organizations, the
latter of which contributed greatly to the progress of Afrikaner society.56
Although the church provided pragmatic aid to the Afrikaner community, it also helped
form public policy detrimental to black and Coloured interests. The DRC considered the root
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cause of the Afrikaner financial dilemma to be not only city culture and British capital influence,
but also the “black peril.” Therefore, by the mid-1930s, the DRC began to realize segregationist
policy through church influence in politics and political parties. The DRC established
committees in the late 1930s and early 1940s to lobby the government against racial mixing and
racially mixed marriages. The committees also demanded separate residential group areas and
even racially segregated work plants and factories.57 The church representatives’ appeals to the
state set the stage for twentieth-century South African apartheid policy.
Since many DRC members were also members of the National Party when it swept into
office in 1948 – and the National Party now had control of parliament, and thus legislation – the
government did not ignore the petitions from the church. The government soon passed the
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act as its first piece of apartheid legislation. The government
also reinforced laws against interracial sex, known as the Immorality Act. The state also
instituted urban separation, known as the Group Areas Act. Two crucial factors arose out of the
National Party’s election victory. First, the government could now send large donations to DRC
social programs,58 thus helping strengthen Afrikaner institutions, particularly the church, through
financial means. Second, in obliging the DRC’s requests, the government began to socially and
politically disenfranchise millions of native Africans. The draconian era of South African
apartheid officially began.
Religious scholar Johann Kinghorn contends that the DRC not only well entrenched itself
in Afrikaner politics, but also fueled and sustained Afrikaner values, namely the family and
hierarchical structure. Furthermore, the churches endorsed the merger of these central Afrikaner
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values with nationalism, Kuyperian neo-Calvinism –discussed further below – and racism.
Therefore, the church not only supported apartheid policy when the National Party took power in
1948, but also assisted in laying the foundation for the “ideology of enforced race separation.”59
Aided by the church, Afrikaner politicians mixed the concept of nationalism with that of
family, which they believed to be the two bases for all human continuation. They interpreted
“nation” to mean a racially common people who spoke a common language. This Afrikaner
notion of nationalism tied to the concept of family values allowed for a radical transformation in
social policy60 that drastically undermined the socio-political order for native Africans.
Furthermore, Afrikaner religiosity based itself on a strict hierarchal order and adoption of
Kuyperian neo-Calvinism. This European Dutch theology argued that the struggle for human
rights, equality, and democratic principles within Europe deteriorated the concept of God’s
sovereign authority over all nations and peoples. Afrikaners considered anything that appeared to
threaten this authority an affront to God’s commands and laws. Therefore, modernism – with its
democratic values, liberalism, and communism – deserved no attention, but rather distrust and
resistance. Kuyperian neo-Calvinism theology reinforced the need to defend and uphold the
God-ordained hierarchal structure.61 Kuyperians believed that Europe pushed God and God’s
order for humanity out and allowed the infestation of immoral and disorderly humanism in. The
Afrikaners did not intend to repeat this mistake in South Africa.
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Kuyperianism – introduced by Dutch lecturer Abraham Kuyper in the nineteenth century
– already started influencing Afrikaner thought even prior to the Boer War. Pauw contends that
Kuyper attempted to restore seventeenth-century Calvinism – when its theological status was
influential and powerful, and this, in turn, carried over to Dutch prosperity and world influence.
Kuyper tried to unify the pockets of Calvinist communities, producing a rise in Christian
nationalism that would be embraced by all nations. Afrikaners, in contrast, interpreted Kuyperian
neo-Calvinism as an attempt to unify, in particular, the Afrikaner community in South Africa, and
set it apart from other nations or races.62
Furthermore, Pauw states that Afrikaners began to give more importance to what he calls
“natural theology.” Instead of interpreting scripture in terms of biblical revelation, Afrikaner
Christians chose to view and interpret scripture through their own “history, culture, nature, and /
or rationality.” They selected texts which justified their reasoning to separate the races. The DRC
pointed to Galatians 4:2, which supported their argument that Afrikaners should rule over other
races. They also added that those races would profit from this dominance.63
Kuyperianism supported this rationale of dominance by stressing the nation as one of the
religious realms ordained by God, under God’s authority and each having their own laws. This is
where the unity or commonality among these realms ends. Since each realm maintains its own
sovereignty, the premise of universalism is considered false. Therefore, “pluriformity,” not
uniformity, is the accepted premise in creation. Students at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU
University Amsterdam) embraced Kuyperianism and its concept of pluriformity in the 1930s and
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1940s.64
Afrikaners, likewise, bought into Kuyper’s theology of the God-ordained and sovereign
realms. The concept of the nation as one of these realms drove their nationalism. Pauw agrees
with Kinghorn in that Afrikaners viewed South Africa not as one nation with different races but
as a “cosmos of nations.” The argument ran as thus: In order to guarantee the separate
development of nations in accordance to their own abilities, the separation of the nations must be
encouraged and maintained.65
Pauw, similar to Kinghorn, argues that after 1950 the DRC and the state – led by the
National Party – had, for all intense and purposes, completely unified.66 The DRC adopted the
concept of pluriformity to justify its theological position on apartheid. By the second half of the
twentieth century, the church no longer needed to defend its reasoning for racial separation, but
only point to Kuyper’s pluriformity of creation, as this theology became anchored in official
church papers. Church polity would then transfer to state policy as church ministers met with
government ministers to propose and pass apartheid legislation.67 In a 1982 address to the World
Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) in Ottawa, Allan Boesak asserted that although the
government enforced apartheid, the DRC crafted, introduced, and supported the system:
South Africa is not the only place in the world where oppression and exploitation
are the daily bread of the poor and the defenseless. What is unique, however, is the role
the churches, more specifically, the Reformed churches. In a very important address
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given in 1980, D.P. Botha showed conclusively that the present policy of apartheid is
essentially the missionary policy of the white Dutch Reformed churches. These churches
not only provided a theological justification for the policy but also worked out, in
considerable detail, the policy itself. It is these churches that from 1932 on sent
delegation upon delegation to the government to get proposals for racial legislation
accepted. It is these churches that worked hard to devise practical policies of apartheid
that could be implemented by the government, while at the same time formulating a
theological construction to justify the policy plans. It was these plans that the churches
finally in 1947 presented to the National Party – which accepted them as a program that
became a winner at the polls in 1948.68
Since the church sanctioned and even encouraged “separate development” policy,
Afrikaners felt justified in their attempt to separate the races in all levels of society. Many falsely
believed that they were doing right by seeking the progress of all people in South Africa through
the separation of the races. Pauw states that their nationalism and “civil religion” had been
blindly shaped by their unwarranted fear of gelykstelling (racial mixing).69 They did not consult
with the other nations (non-DRC churches), for that matter, in their attempt to restructure South
African society in their own image. Afrikaners thought they were creating an ordered and wellstructured society for all groups. What they were actually creating was chaos, confrontation, and
graves for thousands of South Africans, and the eventual dismantling of their own religious
theologies and state policies.
Communists naturally became the primary adversaries of Afrikaner Christians. In 1948,
the South African Communist Party (SACP) criticized the newly victorious National Party for its
exclusionary and racist policies. Black and Coloured Africans – because they too protested the
new government – became inextricably linked with the communists. Christian nationalists such
as J.D. Vorster – also an ardent anti-communist leader –saw apartheid as the system that provided
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the appropriate hierarchical structure to maintain proper social order and thwart the unholy
alliance between native Africans and communism.70 Apartheid did not succeed in suppressing
blacks and leftists permanently. Ironically, an Afro-Christian-Marxist unity, in the form of an
opposing politico-religious force known as Contextual Theology, arose decades later to confront,
challenge, and help defeat the Christian nationalists, and the very institution of apartheid itself.71
The characteristics of, and the players behind, Contextual theology will be addressed in later
pages.
In the meantime, the new government, with the aid of the DRC, began defining the very
concept of apartheid to suit its own nationalist interests. Kinghorn argues that DRC theology and
influence penetrated Afrikaner nationalist thought. The theology, for instance, taught that God
created separate nations to abide by the structures of authority. No true equality within society
exists, since everyone has his or her place within the hierarchy. Therefore, the nationalists
viewed humanitarian internationalism, with its universal concept of fraternity and egalitarian
principles, as an affront to God-sanctioned nationalism.72
Although the National Party accepted the church’s reasoning pertaining to the orderly
structure of nations, nationalism did not mean outright racism. Kinghorn further argues that
whereas racism views genetic differences as unchanging, nationalism believes that nations can
change and are all destined to be equal at some point in time. However, it is the responsibility of
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“higher” nations to guide the “lower” nations to eventual equal status. Since nation became
equated with race, the new government accepted a paternalistic role toward the other races
within South African society.73
The people’s congress held in 1950 – and initiated by Professor of Missions at
Stellenbosch seminary, G.B.A. Gerdener – officially substituted the concept of racial divide with
“separate development.” The congress’s agenda – which addressed the “native question”– is
what Kinghorn describes as the “blueprint for the entire social restructuring of South African
society.”74 Afrikaner and Christian nationalists may have thought that apartheid, now also called
by them as separate development, would allow for the “civilization” of native peoples. The
nationalists deceived themselves into thinking that this new policy benefited all races within
South Africa. The Afrikaner churches, in effect, helped unite social construct with religious
doctrine – making it “possible to elevate secular apartheid policies to the status of faith, and to
turn a modern-day inquisition loose on anyone of alternative mind.”75

The Rise of Political Apartheid in the Twentieth Century
Although the British won the Anglo-Boer War, they gave commonwealth status to South
Africa on May 31, 1910, uniting the former Afrikaner republics of the Transvaal, Orange Free
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State, and the two former British provinces of the Cape and Natal.76 Louis Botha and Jan Smuts
ruled as the new leaders of the new commonwealth nation, the Union of South Africa, with
Pretoria as its administrative capital. Afrikaners made up the majority of the white constituency
in South Africa: sixty percent Afrikaners to forty percent English-speakers.77 Politically, the
implications of this ratio negatively impacted millions of black South Africans for most of the
twentieth century.
Only three years after national independence, racial discriminatory policy had already
been implemented. The Land Bill / Natives Land Act of 1913 limited land ownership to the
indigenous population. The government only allowed ten percent of the total area of South Africa
to blacks.78 The bill assigned racial land zones and introduced what Woods called “territorial
apartheid.” The policy led to black African confrontations with the government and culminated
with the Bulhoek Massacre of 1921. Blacks squatted on land in Bulhoek – near Queenstown –
and refused to move. They charged at a police force sent to move them, and, as a result, the
police fired their weapons killing 180 squatters. The government spared neither the South
African Indian nor Chinese populations. South Africa brought the Indians and Chinese in as
laborers to work the sugarcane fields and gold mines, respectively. White miners complained and
the government repatriated most of the Chinese. The government was less successful with the
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Indians.79
Mohandas K. Gandhi, a Natal lawyer at the time, stunted government attempts to relocate
the Indians during Jan Smuts’s administration. Through Gandhi’s efforts, the South African
Indian Congress was formed in 1923 to protect Indians against government abuses.80 However,
the government continued to disenfranchise the Indian population. For thirty years, the Mines
and Works Amendment Act of 1926 (or Colour Bar Act) prohibited Indian miners from working
in skilled jobs. In the following year, the Nationality and Flag Act prevented Indians from
becoming South African citizens through naturalization.81 Having been raised in his early years
in South Africa and suffering beatings by the hands of blacks as well as whites, Gandhi’s
grandson, Arun, stated that it felt as if everyone hated each other.82 Nevertheless, Mohandas
Gandhi inspired the primarily black organizations of the ANC and PAC to adopt non-violent
resistance tactics against the government.83 However – as will be discussed in later pages – the
ANC eventually abandoned non-violence for more violent means to confront the government and
end apartheid.
Although the ANC became increasingly active between 1917 and 1924,84 Scholar L.E.
Neame contends that “poor white-ism” became an issue to further drive contention between
blacks and whites as early as 1922. Many Afrikaner communities – left poorer after the Anglo-
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Boer War – began to slowly migrate to the urban areas prior to 1925. However, after 1925 the
Afrikaners moved to the cities in droves. Depression and drought in South Africa forced three
hundred thousand whites – mostly Afrikaners – into poverty. The once landowners of the
countryside found themselves as low skilled, lower class manual laborers in the cities, and that is
if they could find jobs – poverty struck one in three Afrikaners.85
Furthermore, the events that unfolded in the 1920s reinforced Afrikaner nationalism and
church-state unity. Afrikaner nationalism began a sharp rise from 1924 when white supremacist
politicians such as Hertzog – founder of the Afrikaner National Party – exploited the bleak
economic situation. Hertzog and the Labour Party demanded jobs for white workers and a white
South Africa policy. They formed a coalition and a new political party basing its discriminatory
“native policy” – legislative segregationist policies against blacks – on the premise that the white
population should dominate “in the spirit of Christian trusteeship with the strictest avoidance of
any attempt at race mixture.”86 The combination of nationalism and racism appealed to many
Afrikaners. In 1924, Hertzog’s coalition won enough votes to assume control of the country.
Woods argued that this election “signaled the start of a program of apartheid, or racial
discrimination enshrined in statute, although the most extreme forms of this were to be enacted
by Hertzog’s political successors in 1948.” Hertzog politically disfranchised the entire black
population of South Africa. He only allowed a small contingent of whites to indirectly represent
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blacks in Parliament.87
Indeed, the political systemization of apartheid policy did not start until after the 1948
elections for two important reasons. First, the National Party did not remain in power
consecutively since 1924. The more moderate Smuts outmaneuvered Hertzog in 1939 by
exploiting anti-Hitler sentiments in Parliament. Smuts retook power for a few years. Secondly,
Hertzog did not aggressively pursue more radical apartheid polices. Ostensibly, Hertzog had
apprehensions about altering the 1910 constitution to effectively disenfranchise all Coloured
voters in the Cape. Hertzog’s successors had no such reservations. Although the former Boer
general died during World War II, the National Party resumed its xenophobic campaign in the
post-war years and regained power in 1948 with Daniel Malan as its new leader.88
Although racist legislation existed prior to 1948,89 the bulk of the notoriously repressive
apartheid laws came soon after the National Party’s 1948 election victory. The new government
passed nearly as many laws in three years as were passed in the first twenty-five years since
1910. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act of 1949 made it a crime for whites to marry
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outside their own race. The Immorality Amendment of 1950 criminalized adultery between
whites and blacks. The Population Registration Act of 1950 instituted a national register to
categorize persons by race. The Group Areas Act of 1950 continued where the Urban Areas Act
of 1923 left off. The government forced the removal of thousands of blacks from their homes and
relocated them into segregated residential areas. The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950
banned communism from South Africa. The government went as far at to consider any call for
reform a communist subversion. The Bantu Building Workers Act of 1951 allowed for training of
blacks in skilled labor, but only in designated areas. The Separate Representation of Voters Act of
1951 – not the last apartheid law enacted by far – removed Coloureds from the common voters’
roll.90
Woods made an important distinction between South African apartheid and American Jim
Crow laws. He states:
Although there were obvious similarities in the Deep South and South African
manifestations of racism, I found some interesting differences both in fact and style. The
major difference was of course that Southern racism was disapproved of by the federal
government in Washington, whereas in South Africa it was actually promoted and
legislatively implemented by national government. There has never been a pattern of
lynching in South Africa, or any open equivalent of the Klan. Afrikaner Nationalists
prefer to exercise their racial prejudices through statutory enactments framed in decorous
parliamentary surroundings after hours of pious oratorical attempts to justify such
measures to their allegedly Calvinist Consciousness.91
Episcopalian Sheena Duncan, the 1980s president of the Black Sash – the 1,500-woman
South African anti-apartheid group – stated to a UN delegation in New York that it was a mistake
to believe that apartheid was a civil rights issue. She added that there was a “fundamental
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difference” between U.S. and South African constitutions. The American constitution, she
explained, “Guarantees civil rights,” wherein South Africa, “that is totally lacking. [South Africa
has] no bill of rights or constitutional protections. Rather, the purpose of apartheid – and it is
built right into the Constitution – is to deny blacks political power.”92
Although rival political parties formed to help blacks acquire more political rights, the
National Party remained in political power through illegitimate means. Both the Liberal Party –
led by popular author Alan Paton – and the less liberal Progressive Party formed in 1958.
However, the National Party banned the Liberal Party’s important office holders. The Liberty
Party ceased to exist after the government’s legislative maneuver prevented multi-racial political
parties from forming. The Progressive Party, in comparison, held only one seat in parliament for
over a decade. The National Party stacked votes in its favor to win election after election since
1948. Although whites had always been the minority in South Africa, the rural Afrikaner vote
counted nearly twice as much as an urban predominantly black vote. Out of the 165
parliamentary seats available in the November 30, 1977 general election, over eighty percent (or
135) went to the National Party, and the Progressives only held 17 seats. Woods noted that the
1977 election results signified that most of the white voters determined to stop the black
liberation movements at any cost, including “full-scale civil war.”93
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CHAPTER 2
Early and Limited Resistance to Apartheid in the English-speaking Churches
This chapter argues that the English-speaking churches failed to effectively confront the
apartheid government and join the anti-apartheid political groups until the introduction of
Contextual Theology in the 1970s and 1980s. Prior to Contextual Theology, the churches did not
have the theological rationale and justification for Christian radicalization against the state. This
chapter begins with the early relationship between the English-speaking churches and the DRC
in the early twentieth century and ends with the dissolution of the Black Consciousness
Movement in the 1970s.

The English-speaking churches usually held cordial relations with the DRC until the firsthalf of the twentieth century. In one particular case, the Anglican Church even entertained union
with the DRC as early as 1870. In 1936, the English-speaking churches, together with the Cape
and the Transvaal synods of the DRC, founded the Christian Council of South Africa (CCSA).
However, the DRC’s increasing involvement with Afrikaner nationalist politics and racial
discriminatory policies in the 1920s and 1930s began to strain Anglo-Afrikaner unity. Both the
Cape and Transvaal synods withdrew their memberships from the CCSA in 1941 declaring that
their views regarding the native question did not coincide with those of the English-speaking
churches.94 Since the turn of the twentieth century, English-speaking churches and missions

94

De Gruchy, “Colonial Heritage,” 157. See also, South African Council of Churches, “The South African Council
of Churches is Born – 28 May 1968,” http://www.sacc.org.za/pages/history.html
(accessed February 29, 2012).The CCSA replaced the General Missionary Conference – established in 1904 “to

44

tended to work for more rights and freedoms for blacks than the DRC.
Early twentieth century Protestant missionaries rooted in “Social Christian” principles
and influenced by the teachings of Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee Normal and Industrial
Institute, taught self help, “eschewed formal politics…and …sought to elevate blacks with the
aid of white patrons.” This form of Social Christianity compared to the industrial “socialist”
form of Social Christianity – as preached in popular mainline churches in the industrial nations
of England and America – in that they both emphasized Christian charity and reconciliation
between the various social groups, and attempted black empowerment through formal education
and religious training. However, the industrial model differed from the “Tuskegee” model in that
it challenged the social structure, capitalism, and the upper classes. Nevertheless, South Africans
of all races, impressed by their visits to Tuskegee in the United States, adopted the Tuskegee
model, which Historian Richard Elphick states made a “profound impact in South Africa.” In this
respect, missionaries, African Christians, and “white paternalists” began forming loose alliances
in the early 1920’s.95
In addition, Social Christians, influenced by the international missionary movement’s
progression into a world-wide ecumenical movement, sought to establish a council whereby the
members would be organizations, such as churches and missions, and not individuals. The Social
Christians believed that this restructuring would help give a louder voice to the black clergy and
laity. Instead, it unintentionally provided a louder voice for South African whites who controlled
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the main churches and “often opposed the missionaries’ activist programmes.”96
After the National Party regained power in 1948, South Africa moved farther to the
political right while many blacks moved farther left. Social Christian activism dwindled as South
African whites’ indifference to Social Christianity’s message grew into aggression. At the same
time, Social Christianity lost its popularity among Christian liberals as they increasingly joined
political organizations. Congregationalist and ANC president, Albert Luthuli, who will be
discussed in more detail in later pages, drew the ire of the missionaries when he began
associating with left-wing allies of the ANC.97
Within the church missions themselves, elitist whites and elitist blacks believed that the
South African racial problems would be resolved and black advancement achieved once
“reasonable men of influence” from the various races and ethnicities in South Africa sat down
with each other to air their differences. Elphick contends that this type of paternalistic missionary
view made sense only as long as blacks had the chance of gaining the full benefit of South
African citizenship. Once the government removed this opportunity after 1948, “it seemed that
the elitist programme of the Social Christians had been a disastrous mistake.” Elitists separated
themselves from the masses which resulted in the failure of the Social Christians to mount an
effective popular resistance movement. Furthermore, the missionaries’ “inherited assumptions”
prevented them from “seriously connecting with the socialist strands of the Social Gospel” that
developed in industrialized nations.98
Elphick adds that the Social Christians’ hopes of reconciling the elites of different races
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and establishing a new society through evangelism, education, and social work appeared
important against the repressive apartheid system. English-speaking churches did begin to
mobilize, however slowly, into a more coalesced resistance against the apartheid government
after 1948. Increasingly under black leadership and “inspired by more radical ‘prophetic’
theologies of liberation,” the churches and the South African Council of Churches (SACC) –
formerly the CCSA – immersed themselves in the anti-apartheid struggle.99
Ecumenical relations and alliances succeeded more among the English-speaking
churches such as the Congregationalists, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Anglicans. The
designation of “Southern Africa” in their title from the late 1960s meant that they were now part
of the international church community. They were also affiliated with their own world-wide
confessional bodies, such as the Anglican Communion, the World Alliance of Reformed
Churches – primarily Presbyterian and Congregationalist – and the World Methodist Conference.
By this time, they also became members of international church alliances, such as the World
Council of Churches (WWC).100 As will be argued in later pages, Contextual theologians used
these indispensable associations and their resources to apply international pressure that helped
dismantle South African apartheid.
Christian Studies professor John W. De Gruchy contends that shortly after 1948,
Anglicans, Congregationalists, Methodists, and even Roman Catholics101 began to speak out
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against apartheid policy. They also passed official resolutions against apartheid legislation.
However, these resolutions did little to nothing to stem the growing apartheid policies of the
government. De Gruchy states that the churches failed to effectively combat apartheid due to the
poor implementation of their resolutions. Mostly white leadership ran English-speaking
churches, and racial tension and discrimination also occurred within the denominations. Black
congregants – frustrated with the lack of leadership within their own churches in the early
apartheid era – continued to press their churches to stand against apartheid measures, and also
turned to political organizations such as the ANC for help.102
In the meantime, individual leaders from the English-speaking church community began
to support a multiracial South Africa. These leaders claimed that the church could not at the same
time call itself Christian and support racial segregation. The churches officially condemned
apartheid, but the active and public involvement by some of their clergy caused division in their
congregations.103 Paton declared that some white members in the Anglican Church, for example,
believed in white hegemony and did not wish to change the status quo. These Anglicans agreed
with their Afrikaner counterparts in the DRC, just less vocally. It is telling that the majority of
the white laity in the Anglican synods supported, or at least did not oppose, the government’s
racial policy. Paton contended that in most synods across South Africa, only a minority of white
laity joined the majority of their white Christian leaders in directly opposing racial
discriminatory laws.104
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Pauw argues that ecumenical organizations such as the Christian Council of South Africa
(CCSA) formed to address the “spiritual and general welfare of the non-European races.” The
CCSA, formed in 1936, originally had the backing of the Cape and Transvaal DRC synods.
However, unity between the English-speaking and the Afrikaner churches did not last long. Both
groups argued over the native policy as well as over South Africa’s support for the British during
World War II. The Cape and Transvaal Synod withdrew their memberships from the CCSA in
1941, forming their own organization, the Federal Mission Council (Federale Sendingraad) a
year later. The CCSA’s influence further weakened as non-whites came to view the CCSA as
paternalistic in attitude and too passive in action – that is, taking very cautious steps in defending
non-white grievances against the government. Pauw contends that the mainline Englishspeaking churches were simply not ready to “resist apartheid in practice.” However, a few
“outstanding individuals” within the mainline churches did begin to confront and challenge this
“pervasive passivity.”105
Religious leaders such as Anglican priest Trevor Huddleston and Bishop Ambrose Reeves
pressed on despite the controversy. Both Huddleston and Reeves, after witnessing first hand the
struggle of black people under apartheid’s cruel laws, believed that the church had to take the
side of the oppressed, and they encouraged active involvement with the ANC. The South African
government eventually deported Reeves. Only Huddleston and a few other church leaders
attended the Congress of the People when the Freedom Charter – defined later in this paper –
was adopted at Kliptown in 1955.106
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The late Trevor Huddleston ministered in the western section of Johannesburg in the
black township called Sophiatown. He began his ministry there under the auspices of another
early anti-apartheid champion, Bishop Geoffrey Clayton. Although poor, grimy, and raucous, the
value of land in and around Sophiatown increased since the turn of the twentieth century. White
sprawl surrounded the Western Native Township, Martindale, Newclare, and Sophiatown. In
Huddleston’s first year of ministry in Sophiatown, the city council proposed to remove all the
blacks, Coloureds, Indians, and Chinese in the western parts of Johannesburg. One of the few
locations in South Africa where blacks could own land in the mid-twentieth century was
Johannesburg’s western areas.107 Yet, the Anglican Church gained a small reprieve for the
citizens of the western townships four years prior to the National Party’s election victory.
Declaring the council’s proposal as unjust to Christian principles, Huddleston asked the
1944 Johannesburg synod to condemn it. The synod unanimously supported Huddleston,
resulting in the city council withdrawing their plans.108 However, this small victory only
temporarily postponed the changes that ultimately ravaged and demised complete non-white
populations throughout South Africa.
During his twelve year tenure in Johannesburg, Huddleston witnessed the devastating
effects of one of the most brutal laws passed against black South Africans.109 The National Party
imposed the notorious Natives Act (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) in
1952 in order to curtail the influx of blacks coming into the major cities looking for work. For
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example, only blacks born in Johannesburg could work there. However, the government forced
work-age blacks to carry identification (passes) proving their birth in Johannesburg, or else
suffer the consequences. Typically, the authorities imposed a monetary fine or a term in jail. The
government pardoned no one for absent mindedness or for claiming theft of identification.110
After spending two nights in jail, Jacob Ledwaba – a husband and father who the
authorities arrested for not carrying his pass and being out in the streets after curfew – came
home with a terrible ache in his abdomen claiming that he had been kicked in the stomach. He
died in the hospital of bladder injury. Huddleston attempted to sue the authorities but with no
avail. Although Huddleston produced medical affidavits, the courts claimed lack of evidence to
convict the police. The courts officially attributed Ledwaba’s death to congenital syphilis.111 The
horrible toll that the Pass Laws took on black society caused Huddleston to write:
The proof and the offense are in fact identical: for if you are an African and you
have left your papers at home you have committed a crime; you can be arrested and
imprisoned immediately, and the quickest and safest way to get your release is to pay an
“admission of guilt” fine without argument. The fact that you are not guilty of any real
offense is beside the point. You are an offender because, by accident, you have tried to
evade the control of the state. You have walked freely where you would have shared
sunbright air with your neighbour; or perhaps you have actually stood in a bus queue in
order to reach your home; or perhaps you have gone to post a letter or to buy a soft
drink….But without a pass you are not entitled to such liberties and it is the duty of the
police to remind you of the fact, for only in this way is control possible.112

For Huddleston, apartheid did not represent separate development for the benefit of all
nations (or races), but the subjugation of one nation over the other. Huddleston believed that the
Pass Laws – being the very byproduct of apartheid – represented unjustifiable discrimination,
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and guaranteed “domination” and the “permanent superiority of one race over another.” The Pass
Laws even went a step further by causing what Huddleston called the “depersonalisation of
man…the submerging of the individual in the mass.” The Pass Laws reduced man “because he is
black, to an integer, a fingerprint in a file, a thing rather than a person. But a sentient thing,
threatened and fearful because of the shape of the society of which he is a part.”113
The stories such as those of Jacob Ledwaba made Huddleston into a vocal and influential
Christian activist prior to the advent of Contextual Theology in South Africa. Huddleston’s
religious purpose and mission in life became self evident. He, a white minister, advocated and
protested for the rights of oppressed and marginalized black South Africans. He unequivocally
stated in his 1956 seminal monograph, Naught for Your Comfort:
I pray God I may never forget or weary in fighting against [apartheid], for it seems
to me that as a Christian, and above all as a priest, my manward task is always and every
where the same: to recognize my brother more than my brother, more than the personality
and the manhood that are his; my task is to recognise Christ Himself. I cannot, therefore,
stand aside when it is He whom men treat contemptuously in the streets of the city.114
A contemporary of Huddleston’s – another Anglican priest and advocate for racial justice
– appeared on the scene in the mid-1940s. More timid than Huddleston, Michael Scott also came
under the direction of Clayton after he arrived in South Africa in 1943. In 1944, Scott founded
the Campaign for Right and Justice. He helped place the courageous Afrikaner Judge Krause as
the organization’s president. Scott also worked with the United Party parliament members and
the Communist Party to organize a national conference for his organization. Scott appealed to his
clergymen to join him, but only five bishops responded, and they all refused to attend any of the
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conference sessions.115
Nevertheless, the Campaign proceeded, and at its national conference called for direct
political participation for all South Africans, for ending discriminatory policies, for distribution
of land to the poor, and a minimum wage to the equivalent of 2 dollars per week.116 The parallels
of Scott’s actions in 1944, in particular, to the Contextual Theology movement of the late 1970s
and 1980s are astounding: the determination to advocate for the disenfranchised, the forming of
political organizations and tactics, and the collaboration with other political groups and
communist ideals.
However, Scott’s Campaign did not succeed in its intended goals for three important
reasons. First, contention arose between all the represented groups. The white liberals argued
with white and black radicals, the Communists argued with the Christians and ex-Communists.
Also, the United Party representatives wanted the assurance that there would not be any
consideration of forming a new opposition party. The organization fought within itself for two
years when on August 12, 1946, black gold-miners went on strike and the United Party
determined to break it. The Campaign uncovered the harsh labor conditions, forcing the United
Party to appoint a formal enquiry commission. In turn, many upset members of the United Party
resigned to give their support to the very conservative National Party.117
The debacle with the Broederbond pamphlet incident added to this calamity. The
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Campaign planned on exposing the Broederbond, a secret Afrikaner organization comprised of
three thousand members committed to preserving white supremacy. Afrikaner National Party
members resided in the heart of this organization. However, United Party officials visited Scott
before the Campaign published the article, warning Scott that the information had been taken
from Military Intelligence and its use could incur dangerous ramifications for Scott’s
organization. Adding more to the intrigue, a leader from the Jewish Board of Deputies signed an
affidavit testifying to the United Party members’ statements and also confirming that the Jewish
Board intended to use the Campaign to form a new political group, in direct violation of Scott’s
promise to the United Party against a new political party establishment through the Campaign.118
Scott decided not to publish the pamphlet. However, the Campaign committee, consisting
of substantial Communist votes overruled Scott. He resigned, leaving the Campaign to the
Communist members. Scott felt used and undermined by the Communists, and shortly after
Scott’s resignation from the very organization he established, the Campaign fell apart.119
Unfortunately, the unintended consequences of Scott’s Campaign may have helped usher the
National Party into power in 1948, and thus bringing with it the extreme apartheid legislation
that Scott probably never intended or imagined. As evidenced in the Scott Campaign, there
hardly existed any compatibility between the Church and the Communists in the mid-twentieth
century. The failure of the Christians and Communists to work together is evident in the distrust
the groups had for one another in the early struggles against discrimination and inequity in the
1940s and 1950s.
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The influential Anglican archbishop Geoffrey Clayton of Cape Town had somewhat more
success than Scott. Clayton, found himself campaigning against the Native Laws Amendment
Act of 1957 with the Catholic archbishop of Durban, Denis Hurley. Their ecumenical alliance
protested the “church clause” within the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1957 that prohibited
blacks from attending church in white areas.120
The churches vehemently protested and Archbishop Clayton, who previously opposed
church and priest involvement in political affairs, called upon his clergy to disobey the law, and
Hurley did likewise. This incident also marked a seminal moment since the National Party came
into power. The English-speaking Protestant churches united under one banner to call for dissent
against a draconian government policy. Also for the first time, even the Roman Catholic Church
joined the protests.121
Pretoria’s attempt to separate black and white worship from the English-speaking
Protestant churches and the Roman Catholic Church produced two unintended consequences.
First, it consolidated the English-speaking churches in their struggle against apartheid. Second, it
brought the Catholic Church into the anti-apartheid movement’s camp.122 The churches could no
longer ignore the abuses of apartheid once the most prominent church leaders in their country
became intricately involved in the anti-apartheid movement. However, it still took another two
decades for the churches to become the vanguard of a struggle that saw political organizations
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banned and activist leaders imprisoned or killed. By 1960, South African Christians –
particularly those in the urban areas – had the will, but not the complete unity to combat
apartheid. They still lacked the binding theology that would unify the English-speaking churches
with anti-apartheid Afrikaner Christians and the DRC sister churches in the push to dismantle the
apartheid system.

The Ecumenical Response: The 1960s
The Sharpeville massacre of 1960 considerably changed the course of the ecclesiastical
movement against apartheid. Sharpeville deeply affected the English-speaking churches in
general, and the DRC family of churches in particular. No longer willing to sustain the abuse and
indignity of the Pass Laws, twenty thousand non-violent marchers took to the streets in March
1960 in an attempt to return their passes and surrender themselves for arrest to the authorities at
Sharpeville. Instead of jailing the huge crowd, the police opened fire, killing nearly seventy and
wounding over 180 people. The police shot most of the victims in the back. Soon after, riots
broke out all across the nation, and Pretoria imposed a state of emergency. It gave the police
force the right to arrest and hold anyone suspected of undermining the government. The
authorities arrested two thousand political activists and permanently banned both the ANC and
PAC.123
Although various forms of church activity in support of anti-apartheid measures prior to
1960 have been demonstrated, the theological foundation needed to directly and radically
confront apartheid did not yet form. Pauw contends that the churches began to focus on an

123

Borer, 37.

56

official theological response to apartheid primarily after the participation of worldwide
ecumenical movements. The evolution to a sound theological response, however, was slow in
coming. At the first assembly of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1948 – the year that
the National Party assumed power in South Africa – the delegation stated its concern regarding
South African racial discriminatory policy. Shortly thereafter, the WCC’s general secretary,
W.A.Visser ’t Hooft, went to South Africa. He wrote a report based on his observations and noted
that black society was falling apart. Visser ’t Hooft denounced the white churches and especially
the DRC for not taking a firm prophetic position against the state.124
However, the Sharpeville Shootings became a turning point for the ecumenical
movement. The WCC became more active in South African affairs when the Anglican
archbishop of Cape Town, Joost de Blank, sent a letter to Visser ’t Hooft calling for the removal
of the Cape and Transvaal DRC from the WCC. De Blank’s letter infuriated the DRC churches.
The WCC considered this incident as an opportunity to both reconcile the two sides and talk
about race relations at the same time. The mediation became known as the Cottesloe
Consultation – named after the Johannesburg suburb where all the delegates convened. Eight
WCC South African member churches, which included the Cape DRC, the Transvaal DRC, and
also the more conservative Nederduitse Hervormde Kerk (NHK), attended. In all, eighty South
African delegates attended Cottesloe, including eighteen black representatives.125
Although the event intended to bring about a more robust and concerted multidenominational engagement on the issue of race relations in South Africa, the declaration
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adopted at Cottesloe collapsed by the following year, and with it all hopes for Anglo-Afrikaner
ecumenical relations. Cottesloe adopted the statement that no one could be excluded from any
church due to race. Also, the statement asserted that everyone, regardless of race, should have
equal political and social rights. Ironically, the basis for the document came from a study by the
Cape DRC initiated before the start of the conference in Cottesloe. All delegates except the NHK
signed the declaration. The DRC delegation issued a separate statement declaring that it still
supported the government’s apartheid policy. With this addendum, the delegates at Cottesloe
released the statement to the general public. The Afrikaner newspapers immediately shot the
Cottesloe proclamation down. Politics got involved once again in religion when Prime Minister
H.F. Verwoerd announced in his 1961 New Year’s message that Cottesloe represented
individuals, not the churches, and the issue would be resolved in the synods.126 Pauw contends
that Verwoerd missed an opportunity to bridge the growing separation between the DRC and the
English-speaking churches as well as to admit the humiliation that apartheid caused blacks.
Instead, the DRC “chose to step back into line with the state, in effect choosing what would
become thirty years of self-isolation.”127
Pressured by the Afrikaner press and Prime Minister Verwoerd’s rejection of Cottesloe,
the DRC not only renounced Cottesloe but pulled its membership out of the WCC. Voices within
the DRC called the leadership to disavow apartheid and unite with the other churches. However,
since Afrikaner control had been “consolidated and centralized” by this time, the DRC decided to
side with the government and its leadership threw its lot with the secret Afrikaner Broederbond
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which was comprised of prominent political, business, and church leaders.128 In the following
year, all of the DRC delegates, except for one, officially rejected Cottesloe. The Cape and
Transvaal DRC synods reasserted their support for the apartheid government and removed their
memberships from the WCC, thus breaking all ties with the English-speaking churches within
and outside of South Africa.129
However, the one delegate that did not reject the Cottesloe declaration, Rev. Naude from
the Southern Transvaal DRC, became a powerful influence in the Christian response to
apartheid. He still believed in ecumenical ties and disapproved of apartheid. With fellow
likeminded Afrikaner ministers from the DRC, Naude launched the Pro Veritate, a theological
journal that provided a space for Afrikaner ministers and DRC members to discuss their ideas
about apartheid, the Bible, and ecumenism. Naude and his colleagues went a step further by
cofounding the independent ecumenical organization, the Christian Institute of Southern Africa
(CI) in August 1963. The CI provided ecumenical study and discourse for members of different
Christian denominations. Membership in the CI was voluntary and open to all Christians. The CI
also promised to not interfere with any members’ devotion to “his own church or creed.”130
When the CI offered Naude the post of director, his church threatened to remove him
from his ministerial position in the DRC if he did not decline the position. Pauw notes that
Naude “regretfully but resolutely” abandoned his position in the DRC, and chose to support the
CI by accepting the role of director. The CI soon became “one of the key organisations in the
ecumenical movement in South Africa.”131
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After participation in the WCC’s Geneva Conference, Naude returned to South Africa
with a renewed commitment to end apartheid. In 1968, the CI joined the SACC after it had
restructured from its struggling predecessor, the CCSA. In the same year, both organizations
jointly issued the The Message to the People of South Africa. This document declared that the
Gospels supported neither the concept nor the practice of apartheid. It also insisted that the
Kingdom of God meant equal justice for all within the realm of public policy. 132 Nearly all the
English-speaking churches – excluding the Baptist Union, which withdrew its membership from
the SACC – and thousands of individuals eventually supported the document.133 Later in 1968,
the CI and SACC also co-sponsored the Study Project of Christianity in Apartheid Society
(SPROCAS). This program generated a variety of publications relating to “education,
economics, society, politics, law, and the church.” Unfortunately non-whites viewed both The
Message and SPROCAS as paternalistic in nature, still focused on “white interests.”134
Also in the 1960s, two important international ecumenical events drew the attention of
the South African churches in the 1960s. The first event to influence the churches was the
Second Vatican Council that took place between 1962 and 1965. De Gruchy argues that both the
South African Roman Catholic Church and the English-speaking Protestant churches began to
work closer together on social justice issues.135 Fascinatingly, modern concepts of Contextual
Theology that mostly Protestant South African church leaders used actually originated from the
Catholic Liberation Theology tradition.
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Latin American Catholic theologians and priests, such as Gustavo Gutierrez from Peru,
Leonardo Boff from Brazil, and Luis Segundo from Uruguay are arguably considered the early
fathers of Liberation Theology, the equivalent of South African Contextual Theology.
Theological scholar J. David Turner states that beginning with Vatican II, the Catholic Church
allowed for more Latin American church leadership participation in major Catholic conferences.
However, not until the Medellin Conference of 1968, did the Latin American church leaders
establish well-defined liberation ideas.136 Subsequently, 1971 saw the official birth of the
Liberation Theology movement with theologian Gustavo Gutierrez’s book, Teologia de la
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liberacion (Liberation Theology).137
In Switzerland in 1966, the WCC sponsored the second event that influenced the South
African churches, named the Geneva Conference on Church and Society. This conference took
an even more extreme course than Vatican II. The conference called for direct engagement in
struggles for social justice and revolutions. Out of this meeting, the WCC’s Program to Combat
Racism (PCR) arose. Part of its initiative was to establish a special fund to distribute to
organization attempting to end racism. In 1970, the PCR contributed $120,000 to Southern
African liberation movements, including the ANC.138
In the 1970s, as the CI began to observe more successful strikes by the black trade
unions, observe the BCM’s questioning of capitalism in relation to black labor exploitation, and
as it received demands for more direct action from its foreign donors, its own attitude and
approach to black activism began to change in the early 1970s. Furthermore, the WCC’s Program
to Combat Racism also made an impact on the CI. The CI began to meet and interact with black
Christian leaders in the BCM such as Oshade Phakathi, Manas Buthelezi, Barney Pityana, and
Allan Boesak (of the DRMC). The Special Program for Christian Action in Society -2
(SPROCAS-2) formed out of the determination that the CI should involve itself directly in the
black liberation struggle, as opposed to merely changing white attitudes about apartheid. Due to
Naude’s and the CI’s efforts, blacks began to increasingly trust the white activists as co-partners
in the anti-apartheid movement. Blacks saw that whites too became the targets of police
harassment, detention, and banning “for the sake of black liberation.”139 The actions of Naude
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and the CI in the 1970s made it possible for Black (Liberation) theologians to combine efforts
with their white counterparts in the 1980s in their mutual struggle to end apartheid.
Due to the work of Naude and the CI, even some of the more traditionally conservative
black Evangelical church leaders also began to attack the apartheid system. In 1973, the Lutheran
priest Manas Buthelezi gave a speech at the Congress on Mission and Evangelism in Durban
challenging white influence in the Christian church and calling for whites to view the gospel
through the eyes of black evangelists. In 1975, the black synods established the Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Southern Africa (ELCSA), with Buthelezi as one of its bishops, after he
attempted and failed to unite the racially segregated Lutheran synods.140
As the conservative churches experienced turmoil due to the anti-apartheid issue, so did
the more moderate and liberal churches. The SACC’s 1974 Resolution on Conscientious
Objection produced greater controversy within the English-speaking mainline churches. The
SACC condemned South Africa’s war with Angola and called on Christians not to serve in the
conflict. While some mainline churches drew closer to the liberation movement, many
congregants within those churches withdrew their memberships to join more conservative
churches. At the same time, this reaction by many whites produced an opportunity for non-white
Christian leaders to attain more prominent roles in the mainline churches. Barney Pityana and
Malusi Mpumlwana became ordained Anglican priests. Mandlenkhosi Zwane became an
ordained Catholic priest, and in 1976, the church appointed him Bishop of Swaziland. The
Anglican Church appointed Desmond Mpilo Tutu as Bishop of Lesotho in 1976, Bishop of
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Johannesburg in 1984, and Archbishop of Cape Town in 1986.141

The Dilemma of Major Political Movements – ANC and BCM
One of the most popular figures in the ANC’s history is the late Chief Albert Luthuli,
who came from a Congregationalist Christian background. He rose to the ranks of ANC
leadership in 1952 and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1960. Luthuli helped organize the first
Defiance Campaign. Its purpose was to protest the apartheid laws enacted shortly after the
National Party’s rise to power in 1948. The Campaign included the ANC, the Indian Congress,
and other anti-apartheid groups wishing to participate. The Campaign would be implemented in
three phases. First, small groups initiated well organized civil disobedience in the cities. Second,
the Campaign spread from the city to the countryside. Finally, the defiance spread throughout the
entire country.142
Although the Campaign did not effectively penetrate the countryside, membership in the
ANC exponentially increased fourteen fold, from a mere seven thousand to one hundred
thousand. Luthuli maintained that the intentionally non-violent Defiance Campaign was largely
successful until sudden and unexpected riots broke out. Luthuli contended that black rioters
supplied the excuse that the white authorities needed to crack down on the Campaign. More than
half of the protestors in Port Elizabeth included juveniles not associated with the Campaign.
Luthuli believed agitators – quite possibly encouraged by the white authorities – infiltrated some
of the peaceful protests in order to stir up the violence that quickly spread into different cities
throughout South Africa. The government retaliated brutally, in many cases firing into crowds,
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killing scores, and passing the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Public Safety Act, which
essentially made it illegal to protest in South Africa. The government’s severe reaction against
the Defiance Campaign deterred many protestors from continuing in the movement, while others
abandoned non-violence all together.143
One main difference between the first Defiance Campaign of 1952 and the second
Defiance Campaign in 1989 – which will be discussed in later pages – was the lack of unified
institutionalized church involvement in the former. Luthuli stated that “the churches did not
speak with one voice.” In January 1953, Luthuli attended the Executive Committee of the CCSA.
The Council timidly approached the issue of the Defiance Campaign. The Council refused to
make an official statement on the grounds that it “does no more than seek to co-ordinate,” and
referred the issue back to the member churches. Luthuli thought the response and
recommendation too “evasive.” He believed that the Council and the Church “as a whole” had an
obligation “to give moral guidance at once while the issue was alive and while some Christians
were confused about the principles involved.” As if taken directly from the Contextual Theology
that did not exist yet, Luthuli emphatically stated that “Christianity must be concerned with what
is going on inside people here and now.”144
Nevertheless, Luthuli praised the Catholic Church and some of the English-speaking
Protestant churches for at least not condemning the Defiance Campaign. To Luthuli, the churches
started to become “involved in the South African struggle as churches…instead of taking the
stand, politics is not our business.” The Christian Council eventually appointed a sub-committee
to draft a statement approving of protest activity as long as it did not conflict with the individual
143
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conscience and God’s Law.145 The Council’s cautious stance on protests evolved considerably
over time. By the mid 1980s, the Council, in the form of the SACC, led the opposition in protests
and non-violent civil disobedience against the state. It is evident that Luthuli believed and
wanted a more activist role for the churches to play in South Africa – which he attained, but only
thirty years later. Luthuli’s own theology preceded his time by decades. However, he led in the
ANC, not in the church. He held no powerful position in the Congregational church at the time,
and therefore was incapable of influencing other ministers and churches, as was the case with
Contextual theologians in the 1980s.
White ministers continued to run the churches in the mid-twentieth century. Luthuli
condemned what he called “white paternalist Christianity – as though the whites had invented the
Christian Faith.” He stated that the Christian ministers “talk[ed] down” to their black
congregants “instead of coming down” among them. The 1980’s Contextual Theology taught and
stressed the practice of the latter. Regrettably, it took nearly another quarter century before the
South African churches appointed black church leaders who related with the masses of oppressed
black worshipers.146
Nelson Mandela – originally an attorney by trade – is arguably the most popular and
important ANC leader, taking the ANC to a new level in tactics. As previously mentioned,
Gandhi had a major influence on the ANC’s non-violent opposition toward the South African
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government. However, Mandela became increasingly frustrated with the white government’s
intransigence toward the ANC’s peaceful appeals for black rights. Abandoning non-violent
methods, he resorted to alternative means. He reasoned that only violence moved the government
to compromise, and so together with a few of his associates, they formed Umkhonto we Sizwe –
which translates to Spear of the Nation and is also known as MK. Umkhonto we Sizwe planned
three phases, if required. First, the ANC decided to sabotage the nation’s infrastructure,
deliberately avoiding human injury or death. If this did not work, they employed more aggressive
means, such as attacks on police headquarters and military bases, but avoiding civilian casualties.
If the government still remained recalcitrant to the ANC’s demands, they planned to engage the
nation into a full blown civil war.147
Eastern Bloc nations sent the ANC aid through the efforts of the SACP. However, the
Eastern Bloc – along with all the major African nations and some other developing nations that
supported the ANC’s efforts – only sent meager material resources. Wealthier Western nations
refused to aid the ANC despite appeals from Mandela’s lieutenants.148 Although many black
African nations gained independence from their former colonial powers, understandably one of
the reasons for refusal of Western aid was that the Cold War reached its height in the late 1950s
and early 1960s. The white South African government – not technically considered an imperial
regime, but a former colony of the British – stood firmly with the West’s anti-communist
“infiltration and expansionist” policies. The churches had better success in getting the Western
world to cooperate with the opponents of apartheid during the 1980s – explored in later pages.
In the meantime, the ANC’s new approach to working with outside groups did not fare
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well with some of its younger members, particularly Robert Sobukwe. He felt uncomfortable
with the ANC’s increased association with the Communists. He also opposed diluting the ANC’s
all black constituencies with non-white allies.149 Luthuli stated that due to Smuts’s enactment of
the Asiatic Land Tenure Act – also known as the Ghetto Act – in 1946, the Indian Congress
forged an alliance with the ANC. The Ghetto act – in similar fashion to the Group Areas Act for
blacks – forced Indians to relocate from their homelands onto reserves. The alliance between the
ANC and the Indian Congress “was criticized by a minority within the A.N.C., who wanted
Africans to ‘go it alone.’”150
In addition, the ANC’s policy charter, the Freedom Charter, equally disturbed Sobukwe
and some other members of the ANC. The Freedom Charter called for a multi-ethnic and multiracial South Africa. The charter stated that South Africa belonged to all peoples within its
borders. Sobukwe believed the charter catered too much to non-black interests and did not
adequately address black self-reliance. The split between Mandela and Sobukwe formally
occurred in 1959 with the formation of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). Many young ANC
activists soon joined the PAC. Both organizations had huge support from blacks within South
Africa.151 However, shortly after the infamous Sharpeville Shootings, the government imposed
the Unlawful Organization Act, formally banning the ANC and PAC in April 1960.152
In 1956, Pretoria previously charged Mandela and 155 other political leaders with
conspiracy to overthrow the government through violence. Mandela remained on bail for most of
what became known as the Treason Trial. After a team of defense lawyers withdrew from the
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case – arguing the impossibility of mounting an effective defense due to the state of emergency –
Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Dum Nokwe, Robert Resha, and Ahmed Kathrada prepared and
presented the defense case in 1960, with Mandela leading the cross-examination. The
government eventually acquitted the defendants. However in a separate trial that took place in
November 1962, Mandela found himself sentenced to five years imprisonment for inciting
strikes and leaving South Africa without proper documentation.153
The following year, the authorities raided the ANC’s underground headquarters in
Rivonia, arresting Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Ahmed Kathrada, Dennis
Goldberg, and Lionel Bernstein. Elias Motsoaledi, Andrew Mlangeni, and Mandela joined the
arrested. Their trial became known as the infamous Rivonia Trial that sent Mandela and the rest
of the accused – except for Bernstein, who the government acquitted – to Robben Island in
1964.154 With the heads of the powerful anti-apartheid political organizations effectively
removed, their organizations banned, and their underground armed struggle relatively ineffective
against the government, and no viable anti-apartheid organization to immediately take the place
of the ANC or PAC, apartheid policy remained entrenched throughout most of the 1960s.
The late South African journalist Donald Woods wrote, “With Mandela imprisoned and
Sobukwe banned, there was for some years a leadership vacuum in South African black politics.
It was filled toward the close of the 1960s by Bantu Stephen Biko.”155 Woods’s words highlight
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the effectiveness of the South African government to root out and silence the opposition
leadership within the decade of the 1960s. It is also important to note here that the churches had
not yet solidified their response to, nor coordinated their strategy and tactics against the apartheid
government.
Therefore, the interim period between the banishment of the ANC in the early 1960’s and
the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in the late 1960s witnessed the height of
Grand Apartheid, whereby racial discrimination had been imposed to nearly all aspects of life in
South Africa, under Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd – its chief architect.156 Verwoerd
became prime minister of South Africa on September 3, 1958, after Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom
– who succeeded Malan – died of cancer. He helped turn South Africa from a commonwealth to
a republic on May 31, 1961. On September 6, 1966, a deranged parliamentary staff member,
Dimitry Tsafendas, killed Verwoerd. Eight days later, Balthazar Johannes Vorster became prime
minister on September 13, 1966. Nevertheless, Grand Apartheid continued unobstructed in South
Africa.157
However, Verwoerd is better known for his Grand Apartheid policy. The Group Areas Act
of 1950 was one of the most infamous laws against blacks. Much like the Land Bill of 1913, the
Group Areas Act forced blacks into segregated areas of the country called “reserves,” “traditional
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homelands,” or “Bantusans.” The government called this policy “separate development” in the
attempt to ward off international criticism of white South African segregation efforts. The official
statement for the Bantusan areas declared that blacks would self-rule over time.158
Pretoria designated sixteen million blacks to nine so called “independent” and separate
“homelands” with the intent to disenfranchise all black civil and human rights within South
Africa proper. Pretoria designated four million Zulus to kwaZulu, four million Xhosas to two
Xhosa areas called Transkei and Ciskei. The government assigned the other smaller black
“ethnic” groups, including Swazis, Vendas, Tswanas, and Sotho to the remaining six
homelands.159
The National Party touted that blacks would have the benefit to preserve their separate
cultures and languages. However, all four “ethnic” groups – Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi, and Ndebele –
speak the common language of Nguni. As Woods pointed out, there are more differences in
words and pronunciations between Afrikaans and English than between Zulu and Xhosa, which
are nearly indistinguishable. The separation of the “ethnic” groups had more to do with control
and development. In essence, there still remained one South Africa that comprised of three
million Afrikaner National Party members or sympathizers who ruled over sixteen million
blacks, one million Coloureds, and one million Indians, non-Afrikaners, and anti-National Party
whites.160
Nevertheless, apartheid policy continued unobstructed during the middle to latter part of
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the 1960s. Although the Afrikaner National Party may have also thought their strategy to remove
leaders of the anti-apartheid movement a success, a fledgling student movement started growing
within the liberation struggle. Eventually, this movement and its ultimate leader became as
powerful against, and as threatening toward, the government as the ANC under Mandela.
Mostly white English-speaking students from the liberal universities of Cape Town,
Witwatersand (Johannesburg), Natal (Durban and Pietermaritzburg), and Rhodes (Grahamstown)
made up the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). Although many white students
sacrificed for the anti-apartheid cause by being arrested and banned, their leadership remained
white. As in the churches prior to the 1970s, whites sympathetic to black suffering usually led the
opposition against apartheid policy and state action in student-led organizations. Biko did not
accept white leadership for a predominantly black cause. He therefore instigated the formation of
the South African Student Organization (SASO).161 The all black organization formed in 1969
with Biko as its first president.162
Biko felt that organizations such as NUSAS only limited the freedom struggle to black
students. Believing that black students understood the black condition on South Africa better
than their well-meaning white counterparts, he wanted representation for all black people, and
the only way of doing this was through the BCM. For him and his movement, liberal whites
stood on the fence on many issues facing black South African society. Moderation would not
suffice, and Biko wanted direct confrontation. As Woods contended, “clear polarities” needed to
be established and the “middle-of-the-road section…eliminated in order to bring about
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confrontation.”163
Anti-capitalist sentiment and the faltering South African economic system played into the
liberation struggle’s hands. Barney Pityana, the chief lieutenant in SASO – who also became an
ordained Anglican priest – contended that the years of brainwashing of black indigenous people
in South Africa by white colonists had to be reversed. Blacks were taught that whites were the
benchmark by which all other races must be measured. White “capitalistic tendencies” stressed
monetary wealth as a measure of status, thus introducing the “class situation…as a value even for
blacks.”164 Pityana believed that Western culture thrived on capitalist exploitation. Whites, in his
view, would never renounce this way of life. Original black South African society viewed the
tribe as an augmentation of the family, with the chief being the caretaker of the tribe’s property.
Within this system, Pityana argued that “all collective enterprise was geared to the general
good.”165
Black people needed to become self-reliant and pull away from political systems that
cater to white voter interests at the expense of the politically disenfranchised blacks. The leaders
of the BCM meant to give back the dignity and self-worth of blacks. “The confidence thus
generated will give them a sense of pride and awareness.” Therefore, the BCM determined to
reject the “directionless” multiracialism for a more “positive unilateral approach” in the fight for
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equal rights and justice. In other words, the blacks in South Africa would go at it alone.166 The
BCM was definitely pro-black, but never an anti-white movement. Biko had much respect for all
kinds of people and he refused to view whites as lesser human beings.167
Woods contended that the young Biko – twenty years of age in 1966 – stood out among
all the many other BCM leaders. By the early 1970s, Biko started to be recognized as the
embodiment of this new and growing political force – Black Consciousness, “a new totality of
black response to white power, and with it a new era in the racial struggle in South Africa.”168 No
other leader in the BCM exemplified this new struggle better than Biko. He mastered his political
skills well and played the principle role in attempting to unite the ANC and PAC. Unfortunately,
the government suspected his involvement.169 Biko did not succeed in unification due to his
untimely death.
On August 18, 1977, South African Security police stopped Biko and his colleague, Peter
Jones, as the two men drove into Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape. Shortly thereafter, the police
took both men into custody, and Biko remained in detention for nearly a month.170 The
authorities held him naked for eighteen days without questioning him. On September 12, 1977,
thirty years of age, he died of brain injuries incurred by at least three strikes to the head just five
days earlier.171 At the time, the Security Police denied culpability, and they blamed the official
cause of death on a hunger strike,172 but the overwhelming evidence of police abuse suggested
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otherwise.
Twenty thousand people attended Biko’s funeral, including whites, such as the Reverend
David Russell, a close friend of his. Major embassies sent delegates as well, and in an almost
foreshadowing of things to come, all the major churches sent representatives to the funeral. Upon
Biko’s death, the BCM had dissolved. Biko held the movement together with charisma, political
savvy, and courage. A spin-off group calling itself the Azanian People’s Organization (APO) did
attempt to organize. However, it never reached the strength or influence of Biko and his BCM.173
The government proceeded to ban twenty black consciousness organizations and sympathizing
groups, which included the SASO and the Black People’s Convention (BPC). The government
also jailed most of the organizations’ leaders. Pretoria also ordered the banning of the South
African popular black newspaper, The World. The state banned Biko’s close white friends, the
nonconforming DRC church leader Naude and newspaper editor Donald Woods.174 In October
1977, the Security Police permanently banned the Christian Institute as it raided the CI’s offices
and confiscated all its assets. After the demise of the BCM and its allies, the government only
believed its remaining threats to be the ANC and the United Democratic Front (UDF).175 The
UDF and its involvement with Contextual theologians will be described in later pages.
However, Biko’s death only exacerbated the simmering discontent among non-whites in
South Africa. His murder by the state invited an onslaught of condemnation from the world
community. The United Nations, for example, voted to prohibit arms sales to South Africa in
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1977. This embargo became the first imposed upon a UN member state.176
In the interim, another powerful movement started to grow. Its ascension actually began
years prior to the formation of the BCM. It was one of the few major legal and legitimate antiapartheid movements left in South Africa after the BCM disbanded. Pretoria would not only have
to contend with the subversive political pressure and military threat of the ANC, but also the
open religious pressure and moral authority of the South African churches. As Borer contends,
“The churches became the only space left for internal legal opposition. As church leaders moved
to fill society’s vacuum…they increasingly were forced to assume the role of political
leadership.”177
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CHAPTER 3
The Rise of Contextual Theology
This final chapter argues that Contextual theologians filled the crucial political leadership
vacuum missing after the death of Steve Biko. It also argues that Contextual Theology
radicalized the churches and ecumenical organizations to take direct action against the apartheid
government and unite with the liberation struggle. The chapter begins with an introduction to the
concepts of Contextual Theology. It proceeds to discuss the major campaigns against the state
that Contextual theologians led, and finishes with the pivotal role Contextual theologians played
in the National Peace Accord.

The struggle for socio-economic equality is central to the concept of Liberation Theology.
Therefore, it does not shy away from its borrowing of Marxist ideology. Theologians Leonardo
and Clodovis Boff state:
Liberation theology uses Marxism purely as an instrument. It does not venerate it
as it venerates the gospel…Liberation theology freely borrows from Marxism certain
“Methodological pointers” that have proved fruitful in understanding the world of the
oppressed, such as: the importance of economic factors, the attention to the class struggle,
the mystifying power of ideologies - including religious ones.178

Pretoria often accused Contextual theologian Desmond Tutu of supporting communism. In his
response to Pretoria, Tutu emphatically declared, “I reject Marxism as I reject apartheid, which I
find equally abhorrent and evil.”179 However, he also stated that the South African government’s
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practices and oppression were “the best breeding grounds for Communism.” He added:
The West is giving free enterprise and capitalism very bad names as the allies of
that vicious system of apartheid. Many of our people reject capitalism and the free
enterprise system as exploitative and for us the enemy of our enemy is our friend. Anyone
who supports us against apartheid, not just with fine words but with fine matching
actions, is our friend…180
At the eulogy for slain Chris Hani, the General Secretary of the SACP and member of the ANC’s
national executive committee, Tutu praised Hani as a “hero and great leader, irrespective of
whether he was a Communist or not.” Tutu claimed that those who invented apartheid and
oppressed blacks were Christians – referring to the DRC.181
Therefore, Liberation Theology’s emphasis and purpose is to “liberate” the poor and
oppressed from subjugation of the powerful, even if it uses Marxism as a tool. Nevertheless, the
study of the Bible from the vantage point of the oppressed “is the hermeneutics or specific
interpretation [reading] used by liberation theology.” The authors, however, are quick to point
out that this particular hermeneutics is not the only correct one. Nevertheless, they considered the
hermeneutics the appropriate one for the times in 1960s and 1970s Latin America. In the Boffs’
view, the very essence of Liberation Theology helps address the concerns of the poor. It presents
overarching themes of biblical revelation: “God the father of life and advocate of the oppressed,
liberation from the house of bondage, the prophecy of a new world, the kingdom given to the
poor, the church as total sharing. The hermeneutics of liberation stresses these veins, but not to
the exclusion of everything else.”182 In South Africa, this “hermeneutics of liberation” took on an
evolutionary process in the 1970s and 1980s.
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Professor of Government Tristan Anne Borer argues that Contextual Theology, the
theology where South African Black (Liberation) Theology evolved to, can only be explained
through its ties to the BCM – “the experimental base from which black theology arose.” For
instance, both the BCM and Black Theology came out of the University Christian Movement
(UCM). Furthermore, the leadership in the SASO, one of the BCM’s main organizations,
included many seminarians. Similar to the BCM, the theology emphasized black self-esteem and
freedom from slave mentality. Although “black” was reinterpreted to mean all people of color
suffering from white oppression, Black Theology also tended to exclude white English-speaking
Christians. Black Christians considered their white counterparts in the liberation movement
hypocritical since many English-speaking churches still barred many blacks from positions of
leadership.183
This period in South African Black Theology held great influence over many black
Christian students from the late 1960s to 1976. During these years, Black Theology closely
resembled its more secular counterpart, the BCM and its emphasis on black consciousness,
which Borer calls the “theology of consciousness.” During this period, Black Theology promoted
black pride, and taught its adherents that the white power structure was to blame for the poverty,
oppression, and lack of power in the black community. This period in Black Theology formed
the foundation for political activism within the churches.184
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In the late 1960s, the CI began to focus more on black and liberation theology. “As CI
members were increasingly exposed to the particular needs of black churches, its direction
gradually changed to a more contextual theology…”185 The CI contributed in large measure not
only toward the evolution of Contextual Theology in South Africa, but also in producing the
Contextual theologians that replaced banned and killed anti-apartheid political activist leaders.
The years between 1976 and 1981 – the year of the Soweto uprisings to the year that
Borer states Contextual Theology entered the South African scene – saw Black Theology evolve
from black consciousness to political engagement. For one, the concept of “blackness” became
replaced with “liberation,” in no small measure due to black liberation theologians such as Rev.
Allan Boesak from the DRMC. He states that “behind the reality of the theology of liberation
and the challenge it poses for the Christian church are realities hitherto anxiously ignored by the
theology of the western world – the realities of rich and poor, of white and black, of oppressors
and oppressed, of oppression and liberation from oppression.” For Boesak, the Christian West
long ignored or even covered up the hard truths underlying the suffering for the disenfranchised
in what he called a “bland kind of innocence.” Liberation Theology is meant to unveil the truth
and expose the “myths” and lies used to spiritually and physically control the weak and
helpless.186 Although Boesak still believed in the need for black consciousness, his greater aim
stressed “human liberation.”187
Liberation Theology’s religious characteristics affirmed its moral and firm stance with
society’s downtrodden, even beyond ethnicity and color. “Class” and not “race” became the
“Black theology must speak its own language to those whom it is primarily addressing: blacks…Black theology is.
No permission is being requested for it to come into being.”
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dominant word of choice in South African Liberation Theology. The change from race struggle
to the more encompassing class struggle was not semantics at play, but crucially necessary for
the Christian revolution188 against the state that took place throughout the entire decade of the
1980s. However, the association between this new theology of (socio-economic) liberation with
Marxism is evident.
Partly as a result of conversations with Latin American Liberation theologians, South
African theologians realized oppression involved economic as well as social consideration. Race
became tied to economic exploitation. In theological circles, the liberation struggle began to be
viewed and written about not as one based on liberation from whites, but liberation from poverty.
Therefore, after 1983, Liberation theologians began to use the term Contextual Theology over
Black Theology.189 This change in terms and theological understanding made a significant
impact on the churches. The broader and more inclusive language allowed for a more ecumenical
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effort within Christian organizations such as the SACC to participate fully in the struggle for
liberation.190
Much of the credit for the change in theological perception is owed to the Institute for
Contextual Theology (ICT), established in 1981 and composed mainly of former Christian
Institute members and Black theologians. The ICT’s goals were both religious in nature – to set a
theological foundation for the advent of a new society, and political in purpose – to prepare the
process for participatory democracy in a new South Africa. The ICT contributed to many projects
and conferences in the 1980s related to Liberation Theology. The institution defines Contextual
Theology as doing theology in context of real life experiences. Borer explains Contextual
Theology further by stating that “the one major idea that all contextual theologians adhere to [is
that] all reflection must begin from within a particular context, or life situation.”191
South African theologian John W. De Gruchy wrote a complete book on the subject and
concept of Contextual Theology in 1986. In his monograph, de Gruchy suggests:
The word ‘contextual’ suffers from the same overexposure as does ‘crisis’, and yet
it conveys most adequately what it signifies. The crisis in the church and ministry in the
South African context is directly related to a country in crisis. A theology of ministry has
therefore to be worked out in relation to our particular historical situation and its
demands. As such it needs to be a theology of ministry which relates not only to black
and white pastors and congregations, not only to urban and rural situations, but also to the
urgent demand for social justice and transformation which arises as much from the gospel
of the kingdom of God as it does from the cries of the poor and the oppressed.192

Borer describes four main concepts that make up Contextual Theology. First, Contextual
Theology utilizes “exegesis” or critical interpretation of biblical texts, with emphasis on
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liberation and prophetic teachings. Therefore, the “task of contextual theology is to read and
interpret the sign of the times in light of the gospel teachings.” Contextual Theology is therefore
synonymous with Prophetic Theology. Second, Contextual Theology pulls from the biblical
stories of liberation. The gospel is interpreted though the viewpoint of the poor and oppressed. It
refuses to accept the economic and social status quo that favors only the advantaged and
privileged.
Third, the prophetic message must be translated into a more contemporary social
analytical framework, and “thus read from a social scientific perspective.” As early Social
Gospel Christians viewed the plight of the poor in early twentieth-century urban America as a
structural condition, so did Contextual theologians view the problems facing South Africa as
structural. To Contextual theologians, sin no longer encompassed solely an individual’s personal
acts, but societal abuses as well. To some theologians, even personal conversion is unattainable
without also working for structural transformation. Finally, Contextual Theology methodology is
“hermeneutical praxis,” or “doing theology.” In other words, theology begins with the
experiences of those caught in the struggle – the poor, the marginalized, and the oppressed. Any
theological interpretation from the wealthy and privileged class is rejected because it supports
the current oppressive social structure. Only theology rooted in liberating practice can be
considered a liberating theology.193 Liberation theologian Leonardo Boff states that, “Good
liberation theology presupposes the art of linking its theories with explicit inclusion of
practice…”194 Similarly, Boesak wrote that praxis, “or strategic aspect” in the context of Black
Theology, for example, “leads inevitably to the mobilization of black people for participation
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with power in the public arenas of policy and decision-making.”195
Contextual Theology, therefore, encouraged politicization within the churches, and
particularly within Christian ecumenical institutions such as the SACC. It involved not only “a
way of thinking” but also “a way of acting,” and “taking sides” with the poor and oppressed.
Clerics and the churches must not be neutral in a time of crisis. For Contextual Theology sees a
neutral stance as equivalent to taking sides, by default, with the oppressor.196 The late Latin
American Liberation theologian, Luis Segundo, made a similar assessment in his interpretation
of Black theologian James Cone’s book, A Black Theology of Liberation. Segundo stated that,
“Every hermeneutic entails conscious or unconscious partisanship. It is partisan in its viewpoint
even when it believes itself to be neutral and tries to act that way.”197
Borer contends that these Contextual Theology concepts – which she calls “theology of
power” – contributed to a more political self-identity among South African Christians and
Christian organizations. The “entire underlying social and economic structures of the apartheid
system” were so corrupt that reform of that system could no longer be considered a viable
solution. Apartheid had to be destroyed, and “Christians soon came to realize that working for
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this would not come without confrontation and a heavy cost.”198
With a more defined and inclusive theology of “praxis” and as more black ministers
began to penetrate the leadership positions in the churches and religious organizations in the late
1970s and throughout the 1980s, the churches began to make the next transition from passive
resistors to active resistors of the apartheid system. By the end of the transition – which took
nearly the entire decade of the 1980s – the churches became one of the main internal opposition
groups against the apartheid government, replacing the banned political groups. Furthermore, the
church leaders became the voices for the exiled, imprisoned, or killed anti-apartheid political
leaders.
No other black religious leaders exemplified the “praxis” of Contextual Theology more
than Anglican Desmond Tutu, Dutch Reformed Allan Boesak and Beyers Naude, and Frank
Chikane, from the Apostolic Faith Mission. They all met the criteria of Contextual Theology as
described above. In the aftermath of Soweto, and particularly Biko’s death, these Contextual
theologians helped usher in a new ecumenical protest movement in both Christian and South
African history.
Biko’s murder by state officials became a rallying cry for the anti-apartheid movement
and a final wake-up call for the churches, but the incident at Soweto the year prior to Biko’s
death had already signified to the world that South Africa would hurdle into oblivion if the
government continued upholding its oppressive laws. In June 1976, twenty thousand school aged
children began a peaceful march in protest of the government’s repressive education laws against
blacks. The authorities fired on the marchers killing thirteen year old Hector Pieterson. Soon
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violence escalated throughout the country. Seven hundred deaths took place between 1976 and
1977 as a direct result of Soweto.199
By the time of “Soweto ’76” and Biko’s death in 1977, the churches stood at a
crossroads. They would either continue to rail against the apartheid establishment from the
pulpits and pews, or take to the streets in protest. They would either quietly plead for mercy for
the millions of disenfranchised and oppressed black South Africans, or directly demand change
from the corrupt power structure that subjugated and continued to marginalize blacks in their
own land. A diminutive, unassuming, cartoonish-looking Anglican priest made the first move of
defiance. In a few years, his name became world renowned for his anti-apartheid activism, and
his brand of South African Contextual Theology inspired thousands of faithful, and even the nonobservant, at home and abroad, to courageously confront the apartheid regime.
The Anglican Bishop of Lesotho, Desmond Mpilo Tutu, spoke at Biko’s funeral. He
reflected the disbelief and frustration of black South Africans in his speech. Tutu’s homily also
foreshadowed the new ecclesiastical movement that was about to take on the might of the
Afrikaner government in a decade long battle of wills, open domestic protests, and international
diplomacy.200 Through the leadership of the Contextual theologians, the English-speaking
churches and ecumenical organizations soon replaced Biko and the BCM. As de Gruchy states,
“Church leaders from the English-speaking churches, such as Bishop Tutu, played a crucial
leadership role in the absence of the recognized black political leaders, many of whom were in
prison or exile.”201
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At Biko’s funeral, Tutu mentioned two important points related to Contextual Theology.
First, he proclaimed that Jesus Christ “took the side of the oppressed, the poor, the exploited.”
Secondly, Tutu also tied the black consciousness movement and Biko to God’s intentions. He
contextualized the struggle in South Africa by stating that the BCM sought to release blacks from
their oppression by giving them a sense of self-worth.202
The stage had been set for confrontation between the church and the state. Borer states
the three interrelated components that pushed the churches toward inevitable conflict with the
state in the decade of the 1980s. She begins with stating that the extreme violence the state used
in attempting to quell the protests jolted the churches into action, or at least into serious
consideration of the roles they would play in the anti-apartheid struggle. Additionally, as the
clergy began to speak out more loudly against the abuses of government, the state increased its
attacks against the clergy, which included harassment, arrests, deportation, and even torture.
Finally, the churches found themselves increasingly politicized as Pretoria eliminated most of the
political opposition groups through repression. Borer argues that the “churches increasingly
became the only space left for internal legal opposition, which forced them to accept a more
political self-identity.” Therefore, during the early 1980s, religious organizations such as the
SACC typically protested against the subjugation of the opposition and human rights violations
by the state. Toward the end of the decade, the church leaders were so politicized that their
“conflict with the state…took on a life of its own” as they filled a “political void caused by the
removal of political leaders from society.”203
South African journalist John Allen agrees with Borer. He contends that in the late 1970s,
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activism – particularly black – was limited to a few voices, such as BCM leaders and
Mangosuthu Buthelezi of kwaZulu. Buthelezi protested against the demand for Bantustan
independence and called for Nelson Mandela’s release. However, mixed-race churches – such as
Anglicans, Congregationalists, Methodists, and Presbyterians – “provided the only high-profile
representative forums in South Africa where blacks and whites could debate the country’s
future.”204
Soon after Biko’s funeral, Tutu became the General Secretary of the SACC in March
1978. The SACC, under Tutu’s leadership, played an important role in the anti-apartheid
movement. Multi-racial churches that formed from the original missions to South Africa and
even various indigenous churches made up the SACC. The membership count consisted of
twenty-eight full participating churches and four with observer-only status. Although individual
church denominations at the time still held a significantly higher proportion of white clerical
leadership, the SACC contained a more representative level of black religious leaders. It also
boasted that its member churches included between twelve million to fifteen million followers,
compared to only four million whites in the entire country, which Parliament represented.
Fortunately for the SACC, its exemplary leader in the early 1970s, John Rees – a gifted
Methodist layman – began promoting more blacks to leadership positions. In 1972, Pretoria
labeled the SACC a black organization. With more “socially active” black leaders in its ranks, it
began to take on a more aggressive anti-apartheid role.205
As general secretary, Desmond Tutu took the SACC from a more reform minded
organization to a completely confrontational organization. As early as 1979, the national
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conference of the SACC approved a resolution that called for civil disobedience against
apartheid laws. However, the SACC held hopes that the government could still be reformed
through negotiation. Contextual theologians such as Tutu, Boesak, and others realized the need to
get politically confrontational with the government to bring down apartheid.206
South Africa had many centripetal and centrifugal forces playing against it as the decade
of the 1980s dawned. In 1974, Angola and Mozambique became independent of Portuguese
control, allowing for anti-South African paramilitary forces such as the People's Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) to
threaten South African national security. The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)
in Namibia – then occupied by South Africa – became such a concern for Pretoria, that the South
African Defense Force (SADF) sent troops to fight the guerrilla group. South Africa lost its
political influence of the southern African region when Robert Mugabe took power in
Zimbabwe. Many young South African blacks fled to join the ANC in exile. They returned only
to create instability against the apartheid government on behalf of the ANC. As Borer states,
Pretoria faced a series of crises that were becoming increasingly difficult to manage. By the
1980s, the apartheid system had become an expensive and inefficient way of holding on to white
power.207
The South African economy began its rapid economic decline in the early 1970’s. The
country could no longer be sustained by its huge but not limitless mineral wealth. Since
economic sustainability required an “increasingly integrated and interdependent economy,”
apartheid became the very antithesis of economic growth. Apartheid limited free movement of
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individuals throughout the country, generated high commuter and travel costs due to the imposed
restrictions on mobility of blacks, and supported a large government bureaucratic employment
system to enforce apartheid laws.208
Contextual theologians such as Desmond Tutu understood that one of South Africa’s
weaknesses was its economy. The Gross National Product (GNP) dropped from an annual
growth of 5.8 percent in 1960 to 3.1 percent by 1970. Between 1975 and 1982, GNP only
reached 1.9 percent annual growth. Between 1983 and 1989 GNP dropped to 1.4 percent while
the African population rate increased to 2.7 percent and the white population rate decreased to1.3
percent. Still, South Africa maintained “the most unequal income distribution of any nation.” The
richest 5 percent of the population owned 88 percent of all individual wealth and 70 percent of
blacks lived below the poverty line. Sixty percent of blacks could not read or write as opposed to
0 percent of whites. Forty-five percent of black were unemployed as opposed to 8 to 10 percent
of whites, and seven million South Africans found themselves homeless out of a total population
of nearly forty million. The reason for such bleak figures was apartheid. Whites held most of the
high-skilled and high-salaried occupations while blacks held the lower-skilled and lower-salaried
jobs. The economic inequality helped produce a cheap labor supply for South African mining and
agriculture. This, in turn, provided a major source of foreign exchange and national revenue for
the South African economy.209
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However, after 1960, decreasing mineral supplies and higher costs of both labor and
technology contributed to increased mining costs. Agricultural inefficiencies hindered the growth
outlook for agricultural raw materials. Furthermore, the mining-focused industrial infrastructure
reached top capacity, requiring the need for a trained labor supply. “Unfortunately, the apartheid
system denied itself skilled labor by reserving education and training privileges for whites.” In
order to establish white economic and political privilege, the government created a huge state
bureaucracy – in terms of defense and security spending and in creating numerous social welfare
and education ministries – that drew resources away from economic and social investment, and
resulted in large inefficiencies in the public sector.210
In 1978, over twenty-six billion dollars of foreign capital investment went to South
Africa. The British government contributed 40 percent, the U.S. government sent 20 percent,
West Germany contributed 10 percent, and France and Switzerland sent 5 percent each. Two
years prior, the SACC initiated a study of foreign investment into South Africa. The SACC
executive committee directed its justice and reconciliation director, Wolfram Kistner, to organize
a commission. Bobby Godsell, a Methodist layman who later became one of the heads of the
South African gold mining industry, contributed to an SACC resolution that would call on
foreign nations and businesses to reconsider their investment and employment opportunities in
South Africa. The resolution did not call for outright sanctions, as it would then fall within the
target of the Terrorism Act, which declared it illegal to call for social or economic change
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through the help of any foreign country or organization. However, as Allen states, the resolution
became “the basis for a formula that Tutu adopted during the remainder of his time at the SACC:
appeal at home and abroad for ‘political, diplomatic, and especially economic pressure in South
Africa.’” Tutu then called attention to the five year minimum sentence for a conviction of
economic sabotage under the Terrorism Act, and allowed his listeners to make up their own
minds.211
At times, however, Tutu did not restrain himself. Angered by forced removals and
Botha’s unwillingness to reverse policy on the Group Areas Act, Tutu – while visiting the
Netherlands in September 1979 – chastised the Danes on public television for buying coal from
South Africa. The South African Minister of Justice, A.L. Schlebusch, and the Minister of
Cooperation and Development, Piet Koornhof, called Tutu into their offices a month later and
told him to recant his statement, but he refused. His continual intransigence toward the apartheid
rulers propelled Tutu’s national and international status among anti-apartheid activists. By 1981,
Tutu became the prime target of opposition by “senior government leaders, politicians, and prostate media.” The police confiscated Tutu’s passport, accused him in Parliament of “supporting
subversive elements,” and also accused him of fostering revolution in South Africa. The minister
also threatened to ban him. Tutu responded by stating that he would not obey any orders to
silence him, and added that the government could only stop him by placing him in jail.212
Mandela – who still remained in prison – liked the small Anglican priest. In a telegram to
Tutu in 1980, Mandela wrote that he made an “invaluable contribution in feeding that fighting
spirit and hope of victory.” Unlike Mandela, some of the other ANC leaders had reservations
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about Tutu and his tactics. However, Oliver Tambo, the ANC’s leader in exile, gives direct
evidence of the value Tutu and the church provided to the ANC and to anti-apartheid efforts.
Although the ANC leaders questioned Tutu’s methods, Tambo declared in a report that Tutu’s
influence could be put to use in “support of [the ANC] struggle, even if not in support of the
ANC as such. We must not turn them into enemies.” In Tambo’s view, Tutu and the ANC had
much in common,213 and they both needed each other to end apartheid. In fact, the ANC
established a department of religion by the mid-1980s and articles on Liberation Theology
started to appear in the ANC’s monthly publication Sechaba.214
As unification between the SACC and the ANC appeared imminent, the DRC’s unified
support of apartheid began to unravel during the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto Uprisings.
Soweto made some members within the DRC reevaluate their stance on apartheid. The church
divided into two opposing factions: conservative and liberal. Although the liberals made formal
statements against racial injustice and the need for church unity, specifically among the Dutch
Reformed family of churches, the DRC as a whole never officially took a direct stance against
the government to end apartheid during most of the decade of the 1980s.215
The 1979 Cape DRC synod passed a resolution basically stating that racial discrimination
did not align with Scripture. The 1980 Reformation Day Witness – written by eight Stellenbosch
and Pretoria scholars – promoted mixed race worship services. The 1981 Storm Compass – a
book by written DRC theologians – criticized the DRC of over supporting Afrikaner hegemony
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and having very close ties with the National Party and the Afrikaner Broederbond. The 1982
Open Letter – signed by 123 Dutch Reformed clergy and theologians – denounced any biblical
justification of apartheid. However, none of these declarations and documents swayed the DRC
leadership into taking a more active stance against apartheid.216
In 1979, Tutu addressed the Anglican Church in Southern Africa’s Provincial Synod on
behalf of the SACC. Although he unequivocally stated that the SACC avoid confrontation with
the state, he pointed out that the SACC leadership and national conference determined to obey
God’s laws over “those of man.” In this sense, Tutu urged the church to move right into a
collision course with the state. He told the group that God ruled over both the religious and
secular realms. Furthermore, as in the post-millennialist tradition, Tutu stated that the church
needed to be involved in politics. He said that God’s prophets opposed any form of religiosity
that did not take into account the “socio-political” ramifications of religion. In the Liberation
Theology tradition, he asserted that although the “most fundamental bondage” is sin, and it is the
purpose of liberation to free humankind of sin, Jesus – being a Jew – would not have known
about this “ethereal act of God.” Instead, “God’s liberation would have to have real
consequences in the political, social and economic spheres or it was no Gospel at all.”217
Tutu argued that blacks would be satisfied with neither economic nor social gains if they
did not receive a place at the political table. As Mandela, Sobukwe, and Biko before him, Tutu
opposed the resettlement of blacks to the “independent homelands.” He affirmed that “no
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security, peace, justice or reconciliation” would take place while these resettlements occurred,
which in Tutu’s eyes produced “unnecessary suffering.” This suffering is what convinced Tutu to
call upon economic sanctions against the South African government. He dismissed white
“altruism” that voiced concern for the further suffering of blacks that would take place if
economic sanctions took hold on the country. He argued that many whites had no problem
benefitting from the cheap labor blacks provided in current times. Tutu promised to do whatever
it took within his power to “muster international support for [economic] pressure to get [blacks]
to the negotiating table.”218
As domestic and international pressure mounted, Pretoria began making reforms to the
apartheid system. The government, however, delivered its reforms through the “Reform /
Repression” strategy. This approach is also known as Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM). The
objective was to apply “managed change” by “keeping political expectations within acceptable
limits.” However, as this strategy began to fail, the government abandoned the rule of law and
leaned toward more violent methods of control. As the “national security” mentality reigned,
Pretoria began to use “total strategy” and “total onslaught.” This meant that the state’s survival
against “communist” takeover required an increased national security apparatus. Of course, the
apparatus cost the South African government a tremendous amount of money to maintain
throughout the 1980s. As Borer points out, “South Africa in the 1980s was characterized by the
following phenomena: a well-organized and lavishly financed military, secret police, detention
without trial, torture, bannings of people and organizations, counter-insurgency operations,
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covert operations, and assassinations.”219
Through WHAM, the government stopped the forced relocation of blacks from white
areas and allowed blacks permanent residency in urban areas. Pretoria also no longer upheld the
law that reserved jobs for whites only. The government even attempted to improve the lives of
blacks living in urban areas in order to gain support from the black middle class. However,
Pretoria made these superficial reforms mostly to quell the international outcry. Blacks still
remained completely politically disenfranchised, and therefore powerless to control their own
political, social, and economic destinies.220
Tutu saw right through the governments tactics. In an address given to the Provincial
Synod of the Anglican Church in Southern Africa in December 1979, he stated that social and
economic progress did not do enough for blacks. The government only gave “crumbs.” Even
though social and economic concessions could be substantial, blacks would always be
answerable to their benefactor – the white government in Pretoria. Tutu added that “there will be
no real security, peace and justice until blacks have a significant part in political decision making
in an undivided South Africa. Anything else is really fiddling while Rome burns.”221
Again, Tutu urged economic pressure. He ignored whites who cautioned him to consider
the negative impact that economic instability could cause the poor blacks. He basically stated
that those whites could take back their false altruism. They never complained before when blacks
suffered from toiling for whites while receiving little financial gain in return. He said the
government could stop these abuses immediately, but did not. Tutu added that “Until they do, I
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will certainly do all I can to muster international support for that pressure to get us to the
negotiation table.”222
By 1980, the political situation in South Africa deteriorated considerably. Boycotts and
strikes sprouted throughout the country. Clergy had been arrested for participating in an illegal
march in Johannesburg in May. The ANC, working outside South Africa, found new resurgence
after many youth joined its ranks between 1976 and 1977. The ANC began to launch new
sabotage attacks.223
The SACC requested a meeting with Prime Minister P.W. Botha to discuss the dire
situation. The government approved the meeting to take place between Tutu with a delegation of
church leaders and Botha with major members of his cabinet in Pretoria on August 7, 1980. Tutu
appealed to Botha to grant him four concessions to help quell the unrest. First, Tutu asked that
the government grant all South Africans a single and equal citizenship. Second, he requested that
Pretoria abolish the Pass laws. Third, he called for an immediate end of all forced removals.
Finally, he asked for a uniform system of education for all South Africans. Unfortunately, little
came out of the meeting. Negotiations broke down after Botha invited the church leaders to visit
the South African Defense Force bases in Namibia. The church leaders knew that accepting the
invitation would be condoning the South African military occupation of Namibia, which they
disapproved and believed to be illegal.224
The Botha regime’s strategy to derail the anti-apartheid movement involved two
simultaneous actions. It produced limited apartheid reforms domestically while also waging a
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“ruthless program of destabilization” against neighboring countries in order to prevent them from
giving aid and supplying military bases to South African anti-government forces. During his
tenure as prime minister, Botha –who had been the Minister of Defense prior to becoming South
Africa’s latest ruler – enlarged the military security apparatus in South Africa by creating a
“national security management system” to defend against the so called “Communist-inspired”
aggression from inside and outside South Africa. Pretoria named the SACC as an “internal
enemy” and the SACC became one of its targets of investigation and attack throughout the
decade of the 1980s. In October 1981, Pretoria issued a commission of inquiry concerning the
SACC’s financial management. The inquiry board, known as the Eloff Commission – after the
Transvaal judge who led the inquiry, C.F. Eloff – attempted to probe much further beyond the
SACC’s finances, and to investigate the whole organization.225
On the religious front, the national conference of the SACC declared apartheid a heresy
in June 1982 and refused to hold any further communication with the DRC until it too renounced
apartheid as heresy. By declaring apartheid a heresy, the SACC argued that apartheid was not
only a political ideology, but a theological ideology as well, a perversion of the biblical
scriptures.226 Two months later, on August 25, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches
(WARC), meeting in Ottawa, Canada, also declared apartheid a heresy227 and suspended the
DRC and smaller NHK churches. South African journalist Hennie Serfontein stated that “it’s a
blow to be knocked out of an international organization as important as the WARC, which is the
only large worldwide church body they belong to.” A day later, WARC members elected
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Contextual theologian Rev. Allan Boesak president of its world body. The thirty-six year old
Boesak became the youngest and first person from a developing country to lead the nearly
hundred year old organization.228 He also played a key role in the WARC’s anti-apartheid history.
One of the most important contributions to protestant church history since the early days
of Nazi Germany was made by Boesak and the DRMC. In the 1982 WARC conference in
Ottawa, Canada, Boesak openly urged the delegates that apartheid be declared a heresy. Then he
called for a status confessionis.229 One month after Ottawa in which the WARC also expulsed the
DRC from its membership, the General Synod of the DRMC met in Church Centre Belhar, Cape
Town.230 The DRMC issued a status confessionis against the DRC. The status confessionis
declared apartheid as a sin and heresy which made a “mockery” of Scripture. Gustav Bam,
professor at the University of the Western Cape, proposed that the synod follow the status
confessionis with a formal confession – in the spirit of the 1934 Barmen Declaration in
Germany.231 The synod unanimously passed a resolution to create an ad hoc commission. Allan
Boesak, along with Bam and three other well regarded delegates, comprised the commission that
would create the Confession of Belhar.232
The Confession would be submitted along with the Accompanying Letter that explained
the reasoning behind what Pauw terms as the “contextual nature” of the Confession. Although
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the Letter states that the Confession was not made “as a contribution to a theological debate,” the
third article of the Confession undeniably stresses, as Contextual Theology, that justice is
fundamental to God’s will for humanity.233 The last two bullet points state the following:
That the church must therefore stand by people in any form of suffering and need,
which implies, among other things, that the church must witness against and strive
against any form of injustice, so that justice may roll down like waters, and righteousness
like an ever-flowing stream; that the church as the possession of God must stand where
the Lord stands, namely against injustice and with the wronged; that in following Christ
the church must witness against all the powerful and privileged who selfishly seek their
own interests and thus control and harm others. 234

The 1986 General Synod of the DRMC formally passed and adopted the Confession of
Belhar. The introduction and emphasis on justice is the first time ever in a Dutch Reformed
confession. The influence of Boesak and Contextual Theology is clearly evident in the
Confession. However, the Confession’s overall conciliatory nature helped unify the DRMC’s
confrontational and sympathetic groups235 to both more solidly oppose and marginalize the DRC
among the entire world Reformed Church community. Afrikaner nationalists dismissed Belhar as
“liberation theology, which they considered a religious veneer of communist indoctrination.”236

233

Ibid., 195, 199.
Reformed Church in America, “The Belhar Confession” https://www.rca.org/sslpage.aspx?pid=304 (accessed
April 9, 2010).
235
Pauw, 201. In addition to unifying the confrontational and sympathetic camps of the DRMC, the Confession
helped with the unification of the DRMC and the DRCA into the Uniting Reformed Church of Southern Africa
(URCSA). The theology that supported apartheid in the DRC kept the younger Reformed churches separated. The
Confession of Belhar emphatically rejected that separation. As Pauw explains, the unification of both sister churches
“must be understood as part and parcel of the young churches’ critique against apartheid…Belhar had provided
much of the impetus for this process of unification.” See Also, The Times, October 23, 1986. In the same year that
the DRMC officially adopted Belhar, the General Synod of the DRC declared that apartheid was an “unscriptural
error.” The announcement abolished one of the main tenets of the DRC’s dogma. The church also declared its
membership and services open to all races – at least “in principle” – racially-mixed marriages acceptable, and racism
– although not apartheid per se – a sin. See also, Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1986. The DRC’s proreform theologian, Willi Jonker stated that the anti-apartheid activism of the Coloured church greatly influenced the
new theological stance of the DRC. He said, “This put us in a situation where we had to react.”
236
Kinghorn, 153.
234

100

However, by the mid-1980’s, the DRC found itself increasingly isolated and the influence its
politically tied leaders wielded in South Africa and among the world community through
Pretoria’s support significantly decreased.
Contextual Theology came about in South Africa at the time to directly appeal to the
urban masses and those who felt disenfranchised for so long. Soweto and Biko’s death produced
a worldwide outcry for justice and liberation in South Africa. With the BCM gone from both the
South African and world scene, another powerful movement needed to quickly take its place
because the nation was heading toward civil war. With Tutu at the helm of the SACC in the late
1970s, the torch of the liberation struggle soon passed from Biko and the BCM to the Christian
theologians and the anti-apartheid church movement.

Christian Radicalization and the Fall of Apartheid
As evidenced in previous pages, separation between church and state never really existed
in South Africa. It has been discussed that the Afrikaner government was closely linked to the
DRC. Historically, many members of parliament held leadership positions in the DRC and the
DRC influenced and encouraged apartheid policy in the government. However, the Afrikaner
government accused religious bodies such as the SACC of combining religion with politics.
Contextual theologians, while biblically instructed to respect secular rule, will use
political means, if necessary, to end the abuses that the state – and all agents of power and
privilege – wields against the defenseless and oppressed. This is also viewed as a biblical
mandate and as obedience to God that trumps obedience to worldly governments when they
become corrupt. Tutu provided a reason for church involvement in politics:
101

If we are to say that religion cannot be concerned with politics, then we are really
saying that there is a substantial part of human life in which God’s writ does not run. If it
is not God’s, then whose is it?…
... The prophets are deeply involved in politics because politics is the sphere
where God’s people demonstrate their obedience or their disobedience….
...Christians are not dualists who believe that matter is intrinsically evil, and
therefore all God’s created universe, material and spiritual, counts for us. The whole of
life is important: the political, the economic and the social. None of these aspects is
untouched by religion as we understand it.237
If Tutu argues the importance and necessity of church involvement in politics, Borer
argues that elevating an issue in theological terms can sway the religious community to act
politically. For example, Borer claims that the mutual declaration of heresy by the religious
bodies of the SACC and the WARC became a “watershed” moment for South African “churchstate relations.” It moved the churches from entertaining mere theoretical assumptions – about
apartheid – toward giving special consideration for concrete political action – against apartheid.
In other words, if apartheid is heresy, than it must be politically confronted. The “implicit” call to
action – through the declaration of heresy – “became an important rallying cry for Christian
resistance.”238
In 1983, the SACC finally started to follow Tutu’s footsteps when it came to direct action
against the state and gave more serious thought to economic sanctions. That same year, an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) report officially linked apartheid to South Africa’s economic
plight, rejecting the long contested notion by the Reagan administration that apartheid was
related to political and social politics, and not economics. The IMF stated that shortages in
skilled labor resulted from restrictions on travel within the country and limited educational
opportunities for blacks. The report also stated that to avoid “serious economic imbalances in the
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economy over the medium term,” it is crucial that the government relax its restrictions and
provide substantial funds “to certain areas of education and manpower training, that to date have
been inadequately funded...”239 Although the SACC did not officially call for sanctions, it did
pass a resolution requesting that member churches stop supporting businesses in South Africa
that upheld apartheid policies. It slowly began supporting boycotts of pro-apartheid institutions
and organizations.240
The Contextual theologians combined the strategy of economic pressure with street
protests and campaigns. The SACC, along with its Roman Catholic counterpart, the South
African Catholic Bishops’ Conference (SACBC), joined the newly created United Democratic
Front (UDF). Inspired by Boesak, the UDF originated in August 1983 to protest the constitution
and resist a new system of control over blacks in local communities. The organization elected
Boesak and Contextual theologian Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa as patrons, Tutu served as the
UDF’s patron until his appointment as Bishop of Johannesburg in 1985. Naude succeeded Tutu
as patron and Chikane became the vice-chairman of the UDF’s Transvaal chapter. The UDF had
been organized as a nonracial organization consisting of hundreds of progressive organizations.
241
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for the Front’s non-racial ideals.”243In August 1984, its “first high-profile” campaign against the
elections resulted in preventing all but eighteen percent of the eligible Coloured voters and
twenty-four of the eligible Indian voters to turn out at the polls.244
Borer argues that by 1983 the church leaders’ politicization significantly increased,
bringing down the wrath of the government. Pretoria countered the new religious resistance by
escalating its repression against political liberation leaders through arrests, detentions, banning,
and killings. After the UDF’s formation, the government also targeted Catholic Archbishop Denis
Hurley to deter the churches from mixing in politics, and Pretoria ordered the detention of
Mkhatshwa. Victims of the government sanctioned atrocities began calling on the churches to
“provide leadership and articulation for black South Africans, the vast majority of whom were
Christians.”245
Instead of solidifying white rule, however, the formal execution of the new constitutional
mandates in September 1984 only managed to increase the opposition’s protests and the
government’s repression. School unrest broke out, and election boycotts managed to keep more
than 80 percent of Coloureds and Indians from the polls. In the Vaal Triangle, blacks attacked
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local administrators believed for raising rent and for suspicion of being government
collaborators. A work boycott resulted in sixty deaths between September and October as police
used lethal force to subdue the protestors. In October, Pretoria called in the military to quell
unrest in the townships. The largest political strike in South African history occurred in
November. Between September and December, 149 people had been killed. South Africa had not
seen this level of violence since Soweto.246
However, one small bright spot for the anti-apartheid movement occurred in late 1984.
For the second time in South Africa’s apartheid history, the Norwegian Nobel Committee
awarded its peace prize to an anti-apartheid activist, Desmond Tutu. Obviously, the award helped
validate Tutu’s stature and legitimacy as a proponent for peace and justice, and raised his clout
on the world stage. Tutu often joked that before the Nobel Prize, no one cared what he had to say.
After receiving the award, he had become an “oracle.”247
Canada’s Parliament received Tutu with a standing ovation. He impressed Conservative
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Although U.S. President Ronald Reagan and British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher opposed pressuring South Africa, Mulroney and his foreign minister,
Joe Clark, persuaded the Canadian Cabinet to apply both political and economic sanctions on
Pretoria. After meeting with Tutu in Paris for an international conference on human rights, Prime
Minister Laurent Fabio – who opposed economic sanctions – was so moved by Tutu, that
remarks made by Fabio on French television inspired the government to declare sanctions on
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Pretoria.248
On December 7, 1984, Tutu, his wife, Leah, and a senior official from the SACC, Dan
Vaughan, met with President Reagan, Vice President George H.W. Bush, Secretary of State
George Schultz, Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, U.S. Attorney General Edwin
Meese III, Chief of Staff James Baker, and National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane in the
Oval Office. This meeting would be the first time Reagan sat in the same room with an antiapartheid leader. Although Tutu and Reagan agreed that apartheid was deplorable and should be
ended peacefully, they disagreed on approach.249 Despite the breakdown in talks with the U.S.,
Tutu received Washington’s attention. There is little doubt that the Norwegian nod to Tutu sent a
strong message to Pretoria that it, and not its opposition, was on the wrong side of history.
Nevertheless, the apartheid government remained obstinate. In July 1985, the government
issued a state of emergency. South Africa had not been under a state of emergency since the
Sharpeville Shootings, twenty-five years prior. Once again, Pretoria gave its security forces
nearly unlimited powers to arrest, silence, and control public gatherings. Guerilla attacks
increased as did violence within black communities, as merciless “necklace” killings took place
on suspected government collaborators. The repressive government response met with increased
international criticism. The American Chase Manhattan Bank hastened the South African
economic crises by suspending loans to South African establishments. The world banking
community refused to give South Africa credit and prevented it from rolling over its existing
debts. “South Africa became starved of capital:” it used its foreign-exchange earnings to repay its
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loans, thus resulting in an outflow of capital.250
The financial situation became worse when P.W. Botha, expected to give a speech about
radical reform measures, instead gave a negative scathing speech that brought down the value of
the rand to record levels. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange stopped trading and the government
froze foreign dept repayment to safeguard its overseas exchange assets. Subsequently, white
business leaders broke ranks with the government and traveled to Zambia to meet with banned
ANC leaders. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) formed in November
1985. It immediately endorsed economic disinvestment.251
Although the government declared the UDF an “affected organization” – which made it
unable to receive international financial aid – and twelve hundred political killings occurred
between July 1985 and July 1986, it can be said that 1985 was the turning point in the antiapartheid struggle because the churches, or at least the Contextual theologians, took the
offensive. For example, the Boesak inspired UDF helped the anti-apartheid movement maintain
the longest sustained protests since Soweto.252 As unrest swept across black townships in South
Africa, the UDF implemented low-level defiance methods, such as labor strikes and school
boycotts. Due to this and other resistance within the country, Pretoria imposed a state of
emergency in order to attempt to divide the black leadership through selected arrests and
curfews. Undeterred, the UDF persisted in its demands for the removal of security forces and the
release of Mandela. As part of the liberation struggle, the UDF “succeed[ed] in turning world
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opinion against apartheid.”253
During this time, Naude, now the new General Secretary of the SACC, encouraged the
churches to take a more proactive stance toward civil disobedience. The SACC issued a
resolution that called for economic sanctions and pressure. This was considered a significant act
of disobedience by the churches because discussing economic sanctions, let alone calling for
sanctions, was illegal.254
The SACC’s “Call to Prayer for an End to Unjust Rule” on June 16 had what Borer calls
“serious implications for church-state relations.” The document called not to pray “for” the
government, but to pray “against” it. Frustrated with its requests for reforms falling on deaf ears,
and the political environment in the country growing worse,255 the SACC now found itself
declaring a type of open revolt against the government.
In the meantime, the newly ordained Bishop of Johannesburg, Desmond Tutu, took his
new Nobel laureate credentials to the Political Committee of the United Nations General
Assembly in New York. Tutu declared that the time for apartheid reform had ended. “Apartheid
cannot be reformed. It must be dismantled. You don’t reform a Frankenstein – you destroy it.” In
meeting the Contextual Theology requirement of social analysis, Tutu appealed to the
Assembly’s conscience by describing how the South African authorities detained, beat, and killed
South African youth. A three year old had been killed by a rubber bullet. The police put an
eleven year old in jail with violent adult criminals just for throwing stones. They had also kicked
out the teeth of a teenager, while another teenager had been tortured in detention until rendered
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in a vegetative state.256
Tutu complained that the world listened more to the oppressors than to the oppressed.
Taking the side of the victims – as Contextual Theology demands – he argued that although
whites claimed that the situation in South Africa was improving, only the victims, “not the
perpetrators, … must say whether things are better or not.” He called for ending the state of
emergency, the end of apartheid, the return of all exiles, and a conference of all legitimate
representatives of each part of South African society.257 Again, reform no longer existed in Tutu’s
vocabulary; only the abolishment of apartheid would suffice. He stated:
We must not be fobbed off with high-sounding expressions about common
citizenship and a united South African universal franchise which turn out only to be a
rehash of apartheid with some poor plastic surgery done on it. The run on the rand has
concentrated minds wonderfully, so that private-sector leaders have gone to talk to the
ANC because they were being hurt nonviolently, peacefully, where it hurt most, in their
pocketbooks. I want to suggest that here is a fairly easy, but quite effective method. Let
the [foreign] bank loans be renegotiated on a clear basis that credit will be extended only
when the conditions I have mentioned above have been met. Otherwise, the credit must
not be extended…And remember that two surveys have shown that over 70 percent of the
blacks believe that sanctions of some sort should be imposed. 258
He changed his previous position of calling for an end to apartheid within two years. He
now agreed with the British Commonwealth of Nations that the timetable allotted should only be
six months. Otherwise, he would call on the world governments to apply “punitive economic
sanctions.”259 On February 27, 1985, Allan Boesak told a group of UDF members that Western
European countries were supporting the anti-apartheid movement by calling for or actually
applying pressure and disinvestment on South Africa.260
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In the United States, for example, over five thousand demonstrators marched from the
Washington Monument to the State Department demanding that the Reagan administration place
sanctions on South Africa. The crowd included New York Mayor Ed Koch, Coretta Scott King,
Imam Sultan Muhammad, Rabbi Andrew Baker, Judy Goldsmith from National Organization for
Women (NOW), Benjamin Brooks from the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), and various other political leaders, religious leaders, Hollywood
actors, and organizations. The administration was reluctant to place sanctions, preferring a
“constructive engagement” or “quiet diplomacy” approach.261
Although the administration argued that sanctions could undermine American influence
on South Africa and lead to further repression of blacks, Congress voted in favor of sanctions in
1985. In July, the Senate, led by Edward Kennedy, passed the measure 80 to12. The Senate
version banned new U.S. bank loans, computer sales, and nuclear technology exports. It also
required U.S. companies of more than twenty-five employees working in South Africa to apply a
tighter version of the “Sullivan principle,” which ordered desegregation, pay raises, and job
advancement for black employees. The House bill banned private investment and import of
krugerrand gold coins.262
The United Kingdom took a similar stance to the Reagan administration, to Tutu’s
dismay. However, Great Britain did stop sending South Africa weapons in compliance with a
mandatory UN Security Council resolution, banned the import of the krugerrand, and prevented
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granting funds for trade missions to South Africa.263 Also, lesser-known figures such as British
businessman Michael Young, skillfully managed closed door negotiations between South African
business leaders and ANC leaders to bring apartheid to a quicker end.264
In that same year, 152 theologians convened to discuss and evaluate how the churches
responded to the socio-political crisis in South Africa. Theology and ethics professor Bonganjalo
Goba, states that prior to 1985, the mainline churches tended to give the “typical, liberal”
(cautious) response to the political situation in South Africa, with the exception of the CI, UCM,
and BCM. He states that the theologians present for the Kairos meeting knew that the “prevailing
theologies of [their] churches exhibited inadequacies and limitations for helping the Christian
community to engage in the struggle for liberation.” In September, the theologians released the
heavily Contextual theologically influenced Kairos Document. Kairos openly dared to bring to
the attention of the Christian community and anti-apartheid allies that apartheid was a “statesponsored theology.”265 Goba believes that the churches contributed to the apartheid problem, yet
he also believes that some church leaders, through Kairos, could help contribute to the solution.
He makes the following observation:
The whole repressive legal order is buttressed by a theology of the state which not
only legitimates its role before the eyes of the Christian community in South Africa, but
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which is vigorously promoted by the Dutch Reformed Church. I believe this is a very
important issue which many secular analysts of the South African problem tend to
miss….
…[However], no one can afford to ignore the role certain church leaders can play
in the shaping of the new South Africa. To do so would be to misunderstand the political
significance of religious movements in the process of political education and programs
for radical change…For too long, Christianity has been used to defend political tyranny,
particularly by the so called Afrikaner Christian leaders in both church and society…The
Kairos Document is an invitation to struggle for liberation – a final commitment to
dismantle apartheid.266
Therefore, Kairos took on the status quo directly, stating that apartheid cannot be
reformed; it must be destroyed. Kairos declared that compromise is not possible in all types of
conflicts. In some cases, a line must be drawn between right and wrong. Anything else is
considered a betrayal of Christian principles in light of Scripture.267
The document went further than the SACC’s “Call to Prayer” statement that called on its
church members to pray “against” the government. Kairos stated that attempts to reform the
government would not work since it was despotic and immoral, and therefore “illegitimate.” The
document also criticized the SACC and the SACBC for being too cautious and urged those
bodies to become fully engaged in the liberation movement. Kairos called for Christian
involvement in political strategies and political engagement. It became “a charter for radical
Christian praxis as opposed to the moderation and pietistic non-involvement of even
‘progressive’ churches.” At the same time, the charter “challenged the churches to respond with a
theology of confrontation and resistance.”268
Although section 5.5 of the Kairos Document stressed non-violent civil disobedience,269
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Borer states that it also addressed the issue of the use of violence in the liberation struggle head
on. The document argued that the structural problems inherent in South Africa were created and
maintained by those at the top, and could not or would not be reformed by them. Real change
could only come from the bottom up. As such, violence could be justifiable, but only in certain
cases. The document discarded the churches’ view of absolutist stance on non-violence. It
distinguished between state violence and violence used for self-defense. Violence used against
the state for self-defense could not be rejected outright.270
At this stage, it is important to note that Contextual theologians did not reject the use of
violence outright.271 Those, through religious conviction or who studied the writings of Martin
Luther King, Jr., such as Allan Boesak, tended to side on the argument of non-violent resistance.
However, Boesak, as King, was neither a pacifist nor an advocate of non-violent resistant purity.
Boesak stated that there could arise certain unavoidable situations where “retaliatory violence is
forced upon the oppressed and no other avenue is left open to them, we do so with a clear
hesitancy, knowing full well that it will probably prove a poor ‘solution’ and that violence can
never be justified.”272
Likewise, Tutu stated unequivocally – in 1982 to the Eloff Commission – that the
oppressed had their limits “and desperate people will use desperate methods.” At the UN General
Assembly in 1985, he condemned the West’s hypocrisy on the issue of using force as a means of
270
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liberation. He said that he, like many in the West, honored German theologian Dietrich
Bonhoeffer as a “modern-day saint,” although the Nazi’s arrested and executed Bonhoeffer as a
conspirator to assassinate Adolf Hitler. Yet, Tutu pointed out that when it came to “black
liberation, the West wakes up and suddenly finds it has become pacifist.”273
Similar to the SACC, Tutu condemned the use of force, yet left room for it when
exhausting all other means. Allen points out that unlike Gandhi and King, Tutu never disavowed
the use of violence under all circumstances. Gandhi’s and King’s tactics required a military or
police force hesitant to kill a mass number of protestors. Tutu, contrarily, believed that the South
African government had no qualms in killing as many street protestors as necessary. However,
Tutu maintained non-violent tactics as long as possible. He believed that economic pressure
through disinvestment and sanctions were the only means, short of force, to help end apartheid.
In an interview in Maputo, Mozambique he said that he would let the world know when “[black
South Africans] must use violence to overthrow an unjust system.” He added, “ I do not believe
we are there yet…I will announce the day I believe we have reached the end of the tether.”274
However, the churches maintained a non-violent policy, but kept the threat of force
opened as an option. The Kairos Document, with its call to greater church political radicalism
quickly became a popular church topic of discussion nationally and internationally. South
African Church leaders dramatically escalated their participation after Kairos, especially in
illegal marches. Not surprisingly, Naude – who signed the document along with Chikane and
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Mkhatshwa – and Boesak led a march that included three hundred church leaders to Parliament.
They demanded the removal of the police from the townships, but the authorities arrested 270
protestors, including Naude and Boesak. In Durban, Archbishop Hurley led a march of three
hundred people to a prison to protest the imprisonment of UDF members charged with
treason.275
In December 1985, the WCC and the SACC sponsored an emergency meeting in Harare,
Zimbabwe to discuss the Kairos Document. The churches invited political organizations and
trade unions to discuss their thoughts on the origins of the current problems facing South Africa.
The clergy also asked the organizations and unions how the churches could be used to help. At
the conclusion of the conference, the delegates backed the Kairos Document. As Borer states, no
longer would there be a difference between “prayer and political action.” She adds that the
Harare delegates also “reconfirmed contextual theology’s insistence that apartheid could not be
reformed but had to be completely abolished.” The proclamations made at the conference in
Harare became known as the Harare Declaration. It called for the churches within and outside of
South Africa to support the liberation movements, the end to the state of emergency, the release
of political prisoners – including Nelson Mandela –and the unbanning of all anti-apartheid
organizations. Furthermore, Harare called for the international community to apply economic
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sanctions in order to suspend foreign debt refinancing to South Africa.276
In Harare, Tutu stated his approval for the use of violence by individual Christians in
order to end apartheid. He warned the delegates that the churches risked alienation if they solely
urged non-violence against an unchangeable and violently oppressive system. He added that
peace advocates were becoming irrelevant against the government’s use of “rubber bullets, live
bullets, teargas, police dogs, detention and death.”277 Therefore, Harare succeeded where Kairos
failed in persuading the SACC to take a more radical stance against the South African
government. In 1986, the SACC’s National Conference passed the Harare Declaration. Borer
states that the SACC now also called for economic sanctions, not just pressure, “as the only
remaining nonviolent method for ending apartheid and forcing the regime to negotiate.”278
The Lusaka Statement reached farther than the Harare Declaration. In May 1987, the
WCC once again sponsored a conference in Lusaka, Zambia of nearly two hundred
representatives of churches, exiled liberation organizations – including the banned ANC and
PAC – the United Nations, and other international delegates. The Lusaka Statement officially
proclaimed the South African state illegitimate. This pronouncement made a tremendous impact
on the SACC. Declaring the state illegitimate now allowed the SACC to consider that the use of
physical force by the secular liberation movement was justifiable. The Lusaka Statement freed
the churches from having to decide on an all or nothing approval of violence. The churches could
keep its non-violent stance while supporting groups that did use violence. The churches could
approve of the aims of the struggle without approval of the means that anti-apartheid groups
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used.279
In 1987, the SACC’s National Conference passed the Lusaka Statement. The adoption of
the statement positioned the SACC from having an indeterminate theological stance on the issue
of violence to seriously considering force as an option in the liberation movement.280
Furthermore, the church had previously been timid in showing open support for organizations
such as the ANC, due to the ANC’s support for violence to dismantle apartheid. However, the
SACC’s “new understanding of the use of force allowed for a growing cooperation and indeed, a
united front between” the SACC and the ANC, as well as other organizations, such as the
UDF.281 With the SACC’s adoption of the Lusaka Statement, many of the English-speaking
Protestant churches fully integrated as a co-partner with other South African anti-apartheid
organizations, thus solidifying and strengthening the liberation movement against the state.
Meanwhile, Pretoria did not concede to any of Tutu’s demands. In January 1986, Tutu
met with Roger Smith and W. Michael Blumenthal – chairmen of General Motors and Burroughs
Corporation, respectively, to discuss how to end apartheid through economic pressure. General
Motors and Burroughs Corporation invested in South Africa, but their leaders stated that they
wanted their firms to stay in the country to help end apartheid by forming alliances with antiapartheid business leaders in South Africa. Tutu and the chairmen disagreed on methods, as Tutu
preferred disinvestment to apply pressure on U.S. companies in South Africa.282
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Economic sanctions had been a controversial issue with the Anglican Church, and Tutu, a
staunch advocate of sanctions, found himself nominated to become the Archbishop of Cape
Town and Metropolitan in 1986. Understanding that his promotion as the Anglican head of South
Africa could be at stake, he decided to call for economic sanctions anyway. Tutu stated that no
other non-violent method could be utilized successfully but for economic pressure from the
international community. He insisted that in the past he called for “economic pressure” and never
for “economic sanctions.” He said that “each country should surely decide for itself the nature of
economic pressure it wishes to apply.” However, on April 2, 1986, no doubt remained of his
intentions when he announced that the international community should “apply punitive sanctions
against [the South African] government to help [the liberation movement] establish a new South
Africa – nonracial, democratic, participatory and just.” 283
In the summer of 1986, a senior official of the Uniting Church in Australia, Rev. David
Gill, called for pressure on South Africa. He urged study and prayer on the apartheid issue, along
with disinvestment in companies that do business with South Africa, and a boycott of South
African manufactured goods. Gill stated that the church held a specific responsibility to ending
apartheid because although the system originated in the Judeo-Christian religions, it developed
through “a perversion of the Christian faith.”284
In June 1986, Tutu visited several places in Canada to urge sanctions. The venues
included Queens Park – which comprised of an anti-apartheid festival, rally, and march – the
Holy Blossom Temple synagogue, Trinity-St. Paul’s United Church, and St. Paul’s Anglican
plans. She argued that, “To have any sanctions against [South Africa] would be to break down the instrument which
in practice will bring apartheid to an end.”
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Church. Canadian politicians and union officials joined Tutu in calling for sanctions against
South Africa.285 Despite his support for international sanctions, the Anglican Church elected Tutu
the first black Archbishop of Cape Town – officially known as the Church of the Province of
Southern Africa – and enthroned him on September 7, 1986.286
Nevertheless, unrest persisted into 1987 as the government’s security forces increased
their onslaught against the non-white population. In June, Pretoria restored the state of
emergency, which was temporarily suspended in March 1986 to garner the support of
conservative Western governments. Pretoria arrested between ten thousand to twenty-five
thousand protestors. The government security forces and rival blacks killed an estimated 2,400
others. The crackdown virtually eliminated all anti-government rallies, black school boycotts,
and funeral protests.
However, encouraged by Tutu’s “blend of rhetoric that first roused and unified crowds,
then channeled their anger into creative, peaceful action,” the masses often followed the example
of their Contextual theologian leaders. Although the police tear-gassed a crowed as they left the
restricted funeral service of Ashley Kriel – an ANC guerilla fighter killed by the police in July
1987 – the mourners and funeral organizers made a second church a rallying location. They
started to sing hymns which turned into freedom songs. Tutu and Boesak made fun of the police,
thus alleviating the anger of the crowds and avoiding unnecessary casualties.287
Despite the set-back for the anti-apartheid movement, Tutu proclaimed, “We are winning
the struggle.” Indeed, some forms of boycotts and black unrest still persisted. In a Christian
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Science Monitor interview, Boesak stated he did not believe that the struggle had been halted. He
said, “The state of emergency has not only strengthened the original opposition, it has created a
new opposition.”288 Boesak’s words seemed prophetic. In February 1989, the church leaders
provided one of the greatest contributions to the anti-apartheid protest movement. They helped
three hundred hunger striking political prisoners secure the release of hundreds more political
leaders. The leaders were crucial to the success of the second Defiance Campaign that took place
later that year.289
In addition, economic sanctions made their impact. Although some analysts feared that
economic sanctions would destabilize South Africa by provoking extremists to isolate moderate
South Africans who sought a peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy, the sanctions kept
South Africa out of foreign markets and limited sources of imports such as oil, defense
equipment, and chemicals. This in turn, generated higher prices of inputs relative to the
international market and made it difficult to sell exports overseas.290
However, talks between anti-apartheid groups and the Botha government broke down.291
Although Botha met with Mandela in prison to negotiate apartheid policy and the future of South
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Africa, COSATU leaders distrusted Pretoria’s sincerity and Mandela’s ability to negotiate from
prison. Since most anti-apartheid groups were unable to function under the severe government
imposed restrictions, COSATU took the lead role in organizing protests.292 Meanwhile, Tutu
openly criticized the soon-to-be president F.W. de Klerk of attempting to drive a wedge between
the ANC and Mandela. De Klerk insinuated that the ANC was not as willing to pursue peaceful
negotiations as Mandela. Tutu blasted de Klerk by stating, “It is his government which forced the
ANC and PAC to turn to violence by banning them and it is his government which must unban
them and create conditions conducive to negotiations.”293
The Mass Democratic Movement (MDM),294 a one million member movement, formed
from COSATU and elements of banned UDF members and other groups, organized an open
defiance campaign in August 1989 to protest against the apartheid laws and the upcoming
September general election for the tricameral parliament. Nine national church leaders endorsed
the MDM and the new Defiance Campaign. The clergy inspired six weeks of open defiance in
Cape Town. On August 2, the political leaders released during the February hunger strike
declared that they would refuse to obey government mandated restriction orders. Young
protestors illegally displayed ANC flags at a funeral service for two members of MK, the
military wing of the ANC. On August 6, at the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) church in
Hazendal, Cape Town, clergy supported an illegal rally led by the town’s leaders. Two thousand
people came to the rally, breaking curfew in direct defiance against authorities.295
Two days later, a multitude of church leaders and scholars held an illegal gathering
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outside of St. George’s Cathedral to protest against the authorities efforts to prosecute those
people held under confinement. The police started arresting and charging the confined on August
17. Tutu, Dean Colin Jones from St. George’s Cathedral, and Professor Charles Villa-Vicencio
from the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Cape Town began to lead 150
protesters from the cathedral to the police station. Two blocks from the station, a band of police
women stopped the marches from continuing. The police women attempted to convince the
marches to turn back. The protestors refused for an hour. Finally, they returned to the cathedral,
but the confrontation produced no arrests. 296
August 19 saw hundreds of protestors march toward the whites-only beaches. North of
Cape Town, police used whips and batons to drive off the protestors from the beach at
Bloubergstrand. White bystanders yelled insults at the protestors. Tutu prevented a full blown
riot and blood bath by negotiating with the lead police officer. The officer agreed to stand down
his troops, and then Tutu called the demonstrators back. The day after, the UDF and other antiapartheid organizations declared themselves unbanned in front of four thousand supporters at a
Tutu sponsored service. Dean Jones secured a court order preventing police from breaking up the
service.297 However, the police arrested approximately 170 women, including Tutu’s wife, Leah,
as they attempted to march from the Metropolitan Methodist Church to the British Embassy on
August 30. The marchers attempted to deliver a letter addressed to Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, appealing to her as a “wife and mother” in protest against executions and detentions in
South Africa.298
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On the night of September 4, the police stormed into St. George’s Cathedral attempting to
arrest anyone there. They also went to a Methodist church in Central Cape Town to prevent
Naude from preaching at its service. The police blockaded the church doors with a Casspir
armored vehicle. The authorities arrested Dean Jones, Naude, Tutu, and others for condemning
the blockade. Ninety minutes later, the Supreme Court allowed the church leaders to be released
after it overturned the ban on the service. Soon after, the church leaders freed the people inside
the church. However, bystanders reported seeing police beat people on the streets during the
night.299
Police brutality escalated on election day as the police killed over twenty people in the
Cape Town townships. A Coloured police lieutenant testified to the horrible police violence in
the townships. The mayor of Cape Town, Gordon Oliver, told a journalist that he would join the
march that both Boesak and Tutu called for to take place on September 13. Boesak and Tutu also
met with diplomatic delegations from twelve countries including western ambassadors from the
U.S., Britain, France, West Germany, Canada, and Australia, urging the diplomats to condemn
the police violence and monitor the protest march. At the same time, Johan Heyns, head of the
1.7 million member DRC, requested a meeting with Boesak and Tutu. Although Heyns refused to
join the march, he wanted to join the anti-apartheid churches in petitioning the government to
allow the protest.300
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Meanwhile, as the illegal September 13 protest loomed closer and as inflation soared due
to government continual expenditure on defense,301 the country waited to see if its new
incoming president, F.W. de Klerk, would crack down or allow the march to proceed.
Newspapers reported that morning that de Klerk decided not to intervene against the protestors.
Thirty thousand people marched from St. George’s Cathedral to City Hall. The government
ceased to ban peaceful marches after the Cape Town march. From then on, large marches
continued throughout the country “with church leaders in the front ranks.”302 De Klerk wrote
later that he did not back down but allowed the march to take place for the sake of democracy.303
However, Pauw contends that Pretoria realized that large scale violence would erupt if it did not
allow the marches to proceed.304
In October 1989, de Klerk proceeded to remove apartheid’s shackles from South Africa’s
victims when he ordered the release of the “Rivonia trialists,” which included Mandela. Also in
October, de Klerk and his minister for constitutional negotiations, Gerrit Viljoen, met with
church leaders which included Tutu, Boesak and Frank Chikane, now the SACC general
secretary. After the meeting, Tutu said that the talks did not give the specifics required to “satisfy
the constituencies from which we come.” Nevertheless, Tutu conceded that the new president
separation. It is crucial to keep in mind that almost all the members of the government were also members in the
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seemed to seriously want to negotiate.305 On February 2, 1990, de Klerk unbanned the ANC, the
PAC, and the SACP, meeting some of the demands of the church leaders in the October meeting.
The government released Nelson Mandela on February 11.306 After ten long years of church
direct action and protest against the government – and for the first time in apartheid’s history –
Pretoria began to move toward the negotiation table with its opponents.
Also, for the first time since Cottesloe, the largest ecumenical church gathering took
place in Rustenburg, fifty miles north of Johannesburg in November 1990. Two hundred
delegates from eighty-one domestic and foreign churches and forty other religious groups met to
seek reconciliation in a conference themed “Towards a United Christian Witness in a Changing
South Africa.” The delegation included the pro-government DRC, the anti-apartheid SACC, as
well as non-political Evangelical and Pentecostal organizations. In an unprecedented act,
theologian Willie D. Junkers from the Afrikaner Stellenbosch University veered from his
prepared speech to apologize for apartheid on behalf of the DRC. Prominent Afrikaner cleric
Pieter Potgietersrus stated that Junker’s confession reflected the official stance of the DRC.307
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However, apartheid did not end with decrees from de Klerk or the DRC. Mandela called
on the international community to maintain economic sanctions on South Africa until the
complete dismantling of apartheid. It still took de Klerk another year to announce abolishment of
the “pillars of apartheid”: the Population Registration Act – which categorized all South Africans
by race from birth – the Group Areas Act, and the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts.308 Not until March
1992 did de Klerk win a landslide referendum vote that finally allowed him to completely scrap
the apartheid system.309 In the meantime, the nation once again plunged into escalating violence
as negotiations involving the formation of a multiracial democracy collapsed in June between the
ANC, the National Party, and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) – under Chief Mangosuthu
Buthelezi in Natal. 310
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that would bring leaders to help end the political violence. De Klerk’s proposal to host a Peace
Summit between May 24 and May 25, 1991 upset the ANC. The ANC considered de Klerk
responsible for the political violence and distrusted his intentions.311 The peace process nearly
unraveled until Contextual theologian Frank Chikane from the SACC and former Atomic Energy
Board chairman Louw Alberts – a lay church person with connections to Afrikaner church
leadership – facilitated a committee “in which all potential participants in a peace conference
would have confidence.”312
On June 22, 1991, a “preparatory meeting” took place in which Tutu helped set the
ground rules. He said that all the delegates could go home if they started to turn the peace
meeting into a political circus. U.S. Institute of Peace delegate Peter Gastrow stated, “The
authority and standing of Archbishop Tutu were such that the politicians and all of us present
accepted these ‘guidelines’ without opposition.”313
Gastrow also adds that Chikane and Alberts “played key roles in the peace process.”
Chikane searched for representatives acceptable to the ANC, PAC, COSATU, AZAPO, and
SACP, and other left leaning organizations. Alberts searched for representatives acceptable to the
National Party, businesses, and the IFP. Chikane’s and Albert’s efforts helped broker the
National Peace Convention (NPC) on September 14, 1991. The delegation included
representative members from all pertinent parties. The NPC produced the NPA, which proposed
to end the rampant political violence, support the democratization process, and assist in the
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socio-economic development of the nation. Twenty-seven political, government, and trade union
leaders signed the document.314 The NPA ultimately helped set South Africa on a course to
creating a new constitution315 which guaranteed democratic freedom for all its citizens. This
proved once again that Contextual Theology and Contextual theologians played no small part in
officially ending the insidious apartheid system.
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CONCLUSION
Theology, especially in a nation that declares itself Christian, is a powerful force.
Covenant Theology for the early Dutch settlers provided a sense of spiritual community.
However, the internal holiness doctrine, with its teaching of salvation from birth – for
particularly white or European individuals – allowed for a racist bias to arise against Africans
since the early period of South African history. During the Great Trek, Boers came to believe that
they were a special people with an equally special mission – a mission similar to the biblical
story of the ancient Israelites. They compared the Trek to the crossing of the Jews from Egypt to
Canaan, the Promised Land. This pilgrimage helped instill in the Boers a sense of uniqueness
and superiority over the African natives they encountered in the interior.
After the British took control of South Africa, European missionaries approached the
Africans with a paternalistic attitude. However, the missionary work of societies such as the
LMS converted and educated whole groups of African people – the Khoikhoi and Xhosa are just
two examples. The missionaries also brought with them their own theologies. Pre-millennialism,
with its hands-off approach to government affairs, appealed more to conservative Christians.
While post-millennialism, on the other hand, sought for state intervention, when it came to
curing societal ills, and influenced liberal church tradition. Late twentieth-century South African
Contextual Theology had much in common with post-millennialism. The European churches, by
no means non-racist in their early period, had an open policy of inclusion in worship services and
in education of Africans.
Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Theology, on the other hand, slowly began to subject its
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African converts to segregation. The segregation began in the churches. The synod of 1857
forced Cape DRC Coloured and black congregants to separate buildings known as gestichte.
DRC churches in the Afrikaner republics contained all white congregations. Those churches did
not concern themselves much with converting the native population, and thus left the
proselytizing to the European missionaries. However, the DRC developed closer ties to the
government, especially when regarding race laws.
The DRC influenced Afrikaner politicians in merging the concept of nationalism with that
of family. The word “nation” began to mean a racially common people who spoke a common
language. This new notion of nationalism altered the socio-political order for native Africans.
Furthermore, the Afrikaner church’s adoption of the nineteenth-century European Dutch
Theology known as Kuyperian neo-Calvinism essentially dismissed the concept of modernism
and reinforced the need to maintain the God-ordained hierarchal structure. Afrikaners also
interpreted Kuyperian neo-Calvinism to mean the unification of the Afrikaner community in
South Africa – set apart from other nations or races. Afrikaner Christians adopted the concept of
“natural theology” in interpreting scripture through their own historical, cultural, natural, and
rational experiences. They selected biblical texts to justify their reasoning behind the separation
of the races, and even justifying their rule over them. The acceptance of the concept of
“pluriformity” and “cosmos of nations,” which encouraged the separate development of nations,
helped solidify the DRC’s relationship with the state in the 1950s. Kuyperian neo-Calvinism
Theology became entrenched in church polity; the theology justified the church’s proposal of
apartheid legislation.
The general election of 1948 ushered in the racist National Party into power, and with it,
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the period of Grand Apartheid. Pretoria reinforced or imposed restrictions on non-whites through
legislative means in almost every area of public and private life. The most popular anti-apartheid
organization, the ANC, sought to combat the apartheid government through non-violent means
until the 1960s. Frustrated with the ANC’s vain attempts to overturn the apartheid system,
Nelson Mandela and others in the ANC formed their militant offshoot, Umkhonto we Sizwe, in
the attempt to force the government to the bargaining table. However, Pretoria arrested or banned
most of the leaders from the ANC and PAC, and also banned their organizations from South
Africa.
Meanwhile, the churches played a slowly evolving role in the anti-apartheid movement.
As Elphick states, the Social Christians of the inter-war years did not purport to be “prophetic.”
As opposed to Contextual theologians of the 1980s, “their goal was not to demolish a repressive
structure, but to let God transfigure society through the slow gestation of Christ’s Kingdom in its
midst.”316 The Tuskegee model of Social Christianity, with its paternalistic and elitist views
failed to help the advancement of black Africans. The elitists tended to distance themselves from
the black masses. Thus, when Pretoria eliminated any chances for black enfranchisement after
1948, Social Christians found themselves alienated from the masses and thus unable to form a
popular resistance movement. The Social Christian experience in South African can be compared
black Tuskegee airmen experience in the United State. The airmen believed that “reasonable
men” in the post-1945 Southern society would accept them as equals once they proved their
service to their country. However, entrenched racism and Jim Crow laws persisted upon the
airmen’s return to the home-front. Only with the more radicalized Civil Rights movement, led by
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Black theologians, such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Ralph Abernathy, did Jim Crow end.
Similarly, Tuskegee Social Christian indoctrination proved a failure in South Africa when more
entrenched white Afrikaner determination to maintain the status quo among blacks persisted after
1948. It would be left to the Contextual theologians, such as Desmond Tutu and Allan Boesak, to
help dismantle the apartheid system in South Africa.317
In the 1940s and 1950s, white clergymen took up the mantle to resist apartheid
legislation. Ministers, such as Anglican Trevor Huddleston, heroically fought the Pass Law
enforcement in Johannesburg, while Michael Scott, through his Campaign for Right and Justice,
attempted to build coalitions with political organizations – including the Communist Party – in
order to confront the apartheid government. However, as the Social Christians before them, the
churches of the 1940s and 1950s still did not include more black Christians in church leadership
roles. Black leaders would have brought to the mainline churches the radicalization needed to
confront the apartheid government. In addition, the churches’ inability to connect with or relate
to leftist groups hindered their ability to build strong anti-apartheid alliances. Contextual
theologians avoided the same mistakes of the Social Christians by taking leadership roles in their
churches and ecumenical groups and allying themselves with political groups such as the ANC,
the South Africa Communist Party, and the UDF. Congregationalist and ANC president Albert
Luthuli encouraged church participation against the apartheid system. To Luthuli’s frustration,
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the churches usually reacted cautiously. However, the Sharpeville Shootings of 1960 galvanized
the churches to act in a more proactive manner.
That same year, the WCC convened the Cottesloe Consultation with the hope of bringing
about a more concerted multi-denominational effort on the issue of race relations in South Africa.
Cottesloe declared that no one could be excluded from any church due to race and asserted that
everyone, regardless of race, should have equal political and social rights. However, Cottesloe
collapsed the following year, and with it all hopes for English-Afrikaner ecumenical relations.
The WCC revoked the DRC’s membership when the DRC refused to reject apartheid.
Aside from Cottesloe, two international ecumenical events drew the attention of the
South African churches in the 1960s. First, the Second Vatican Council took place between 1962
and 1965. During this council, the Catholic Church allowed for more Latin American church
leadership participation in major Catholic conferences. Latin American Catholic theologians and
priests, such as Gustavo Gutierrez, Leonardo Boff, Clodovis Boff , and Luis Segundo contributed
to the theology that focused on the suffering and eventual liberation of the oppressed. However
this theology did not fully develop not until 1968, by the time of the Medellin Conference.
Second, the WCC sponsored the Geneva Conference on Church and Society. Taking a more
radical course than Vatican II, the Conference called for direct engagement in struggles for social
justice and revolutions. Out of this meeting, the WCC’s Program to Combat Racism (PCR)
arose.
The 1960s also saw Naude and his fellow anti-apartheid ministers launched the Pro
Veritate, the theological journal that fostered dialogue between Afrikaner ministers and DRC
members to discuss apartheid, the Bible, and ecumenism. Naude and his colleagues also
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cofounded the independent CI in August of 1963. This organization provided ecumenical study
and discourse for members of different Christian denominations. Naude preferred to stay with
the CI rather than keep his prominent leadership position in the DRC.
After participating in the WCC’s Geneva Conference, Naude returned to South Africa
with the commitment to end apartheid. In 1968, the CI joined the SACC and together both
organizations issued The Message to the People of South Africa, a document which declared that
the Gospels supported neither the concept nor the practice of apartheid, and that the Kingdom of
God meant equal justice for all, including justice within the realm of public policy. In the same
year, the CI and the SACC also co-sponsored the Study Project of Christianity in Apartheid
Society (SPROCAS), a program geared toward the emphasis on education, the economy, social
issues, politics, law, and religion. However, the paternalistic attitude of this program resulted in
its failure to attract non-whites. The CI and the SACC had yet to have the key ingredient that
bound all the anti-apartheid forces – Contextual Theology.
Liberation Theology had just started to make its way into the South African churches, or
at least into the minds their leaders, as a way to biblically justify confrontation with the
government. In addition, there remained a crucial piece required to fully implement Liberation
Theology in South Africa –black clergy in positions of ecclesiastical power. Before 1968, no
concrete theology of liberation existed. For this reason, the churches remained ineffective to
combat apartheid.
Therefore, between 1964 and 1968, no effective anti-apartheid political organization
remained that challenged the South African government. However, the late 1960s ushered in the
young and extremely talented Stephen Biko, and the BCM, which included mainly young
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college-age activists. Many leaders in the BCM came out of English-speaking churches and
seminaries. Black Theology, a subset of Liberation Theology and an import from Civil Rights
leaders in the U.S., made an impact on many BCM members. Led by the charismatic Biko, the
BCM grew in popularity and filled in the anti-apartheid movement vacuum left by the ANC.
However, the anti-apartheid movement received a blow when the authorities killed Biko and
banned the BCM in 1978. Once again, the movement was left without a leader and a solid
political organization to confront the government. However, Contextual Theology trained church
leaders stepped in that same year.
Only in the 1970s did the CI begin to change its attitude toward black activism as it
noticed successful engagements against the state by black trade unions and the BCM. Meetings
with black Christian leaders in the BCM such as Oshade Phakathi, Manas Buthelezi, Barney
Pityana, and Allan Boesak proved fruitful. The Special Program for Christian Action in Society 2 (SPROCAS-2) formed out of these discussions. This program produced a more symbiotic
working relationship between whites and blacks that eventual proved successful in their struggle
to end apartheid in the 1980s.
Another significant event happened in the mid-1970s that contributed to the churches’
increased activism in the anti-apartheid struggle. As the English-speaking churches leaned
toward supporting the anti-apartheid movement, their church leadership structure changed
considerably. Many white clergy left to find sanctuary in conservative churches, leaving a
substantial void in the church leadership. Blacks and Coloureds – some with education in
Liberation and Black Theology – quickly filled these positions. By the time of the Soweto
uprisings and Biko’s death, the English-speaking churches, with their new Contextual Theology
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–trained black and Coloured leaders began to takeover the front lines in the anti-apartheid
struggle. The 1970s and 1980s saw a significant increase in non-white clergy taking prominent
leadership roles in the churches and church institutions. Furthermore, the establishment the
Institute for Contextual Theology (ICT) contributed to an upsurge of Contextual Theology
training, particularly among church clergy.
Contextual Theologians filled that much need vacuum after the banning of most antiapartheid political groups. As equally important, Contextual Theology radicalized and politicized
the churches and particularly the South African Christian masses and ecumenical organizations,
to lead the anti-apartheid movement that helped dismantle apartheid by the end of the 1980s.
This combination was missing during the 1940s and 1950s, when clergy such as Huddleston and
Scott made little success in ending apartheid. Scott’s alliance with the Communist Party proved a
failure because they did not trust each other. Contextual Theology, with its borrowing of certain
Marxist principles, related to the left-leaning political groups and movements in the 1980s.
Contextual Theologians found common ground with the oppressed masses and anti-apartheid
political organizations such as the ANC. As Borer adequately states:
Without these new ideas, church initiatives, in the form of challenging repressive
governments and actively working towards social justice, would never have been
possible. The old “universe of discourse” simply would not have allowed it, indeed might
never have imagined it. When liberation theology was applied to the South African case,
the results were profound. Indeed the question of legitimacy of the state could not have
occurred without new thinking about such concepts as poverty, violence, and action. In
fact, the theoretical underpinnings of the legitimacy declaration were not even considered
“religious” issues in the previous discourse of “church theology.”318
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positions of leadership in the churches and church institutions. Contextual Theology “works
with” not “works for” the oppressed. In South Africa, the oppressed were considered the nonwhites and the poor. In addition, non-white leaders obviously had the trust and following of the
non-white masses more than their white counterparts. Therefore, two important impediments
prevented the churches from becoming more politicized in the 1960s and early 1970s antiapartheid struggle, especially after Sharpeville. First, the churches signed the Cottesloe
declaration, yet they did not follow-up with any direct action against the oppressor, in this case
the state, as Contextual Theology requires. The churches began to gain the concept of Liberation
Theology only in the late 1960s. Second, the churches still lacked the appointment of black
clergy to prominent leadership positions in the churches. As a result, the churches could not have
succeeded with any sustained street protests or political actions against the government without
the leadership of non-whites – the oppressed themselves – before the late 1970s.
By the 1980s, however, the South African English-speaking churches and their Christian
institutions began taking on an increasingly confrontational, and successful, stance against the
apartheid government. As Elphick argues, the South African version of Social Christianity found
itself “impotent” against the repression of the apartheid state and began to wane in popularity as
more radical prophetic Christianity began appearing on the scene in the 1970s.319 After the
Sharpeville massacre of 1960, the churches could have radicalized against the state, but instead
issued condemning statements against apartheid through the Cottesloe Consultation. The
churches neither condemned nor confronted the state itself. Even during the Soweto riots, the
churches, particularly the English-speaking churches, made little to no direct action against the
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state.
Only after churches and ecumenical organizations began appointing Contextual
theologians to prominent positions of power did the churches, or at least the black Christian
masses within the churches, become increasingly politicized and radicalized. The SACC made
Tutu general secretary of its organization in 1979. The Anglican Church kept electing Tutu to
higher levels of power until he became archbishop in 1985. The WARC elected Boesak as
president in 1982. Naude – a white Contextual theologian – made great strides as director of the
CI. Chikane took over as SACC’s general secretary after Tutu left in 1984.
The Contextual theologians contributed greatly within their new positions of power
against the apartheid system. They kept taking the churches to more radical levels of engagement
with Pretoria throughout the decade of the 1980s. Tutu and Boesak called for economic sanctions
in their international travels. Their appeals helped garner support from powerful Western nations,
such as Canada and France, as well as the reluctant U.S. and England. Tutu, Boesak, Chikane,
and Naude, led mass rallies and protests in South Africa, filling in the vacuum left by political
organizations such as the ANC, the PAC, and the BCM. They relentlessly kept the pressure on
Pretoria.
At the same time, the WARC declared apartheid a heresy and suspended the DRC and
smaller DRC churches in 1982. Boesak and the Coloured DRMC – one of the sister churches
that the DRC established in the 1950s and 1960s after the DRC began to expand into African
areas – made a significant contribution to anti-apartheid church history. In 1982, Boesak and the
DRMC also called apartheid a sin and heresy in their status confessionis. This statement led to
the declaration of the Confession of Belhar in 1986, with Boesak as one of its authors. Although
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the DRMC split along lines of confrontation and sympathy toward the DRC, the Confession
unified these two groups to oppose the DRC and marginalize it among the world Reformed
Church community. This also made an impact on Pretoria’s international relations since its
delegates no longer wielded much diplomatic influence on other nations when it came to the
issue of support for the apartheid government.
Likewise, the Contextual theologian-led churches and ecumenical organizations
maintained their pressure on Pretoria. The 1985 release of the Contextual theologian authored
Kairos document declared no compromise with the government until the total dismantling of
apartheid. The document went as far as to call the government immoral and illegitimate. The
document also urged the churches to increase their levels of confrontation and resistance –
without ruling out violence – against the state.
That same year, the Harare Declaration called for the adoption of the Kairos Document
and for the churches inside and outside of South Africa to support the anti-apartheid struggle
within South Africa, and for the international community to apply economic sanctions to suspend
foreign dept refinancing to South Africa. Harare also succeeded in persuading the SACC to take
a more radical stance against the South African government. In 1986, the SACC’s National
Conference passed the Harare Declaration and called for economic sanctions against apartheid.
In 1987, the Lusaka Statement took the Harare Declaration a step further. The WCC
sponsored conference in Lusaka, Zambia gathered nearly two hundred representatives of
churches, exiled liberation organizations – including the banned ANC and PAC – the United
Nations, and other international delegates. Lusaka officially declared the South African state
illegitimate. The pronouncement allowed the churches to approve the aims of the anti-apartheid
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struggle without approval of the means – even if that meant violence – that some anti-apartheid
groups used. The SACC’s adoption of the Lusaka Statement allowed many of the Englishspeaking Protestant churches to partner with other South African anti-apartheid organizations,
such as the ANC underground, thus solidifying and strengthening the liberation movement
against the state – an accomplishment that prior religious leaders, such as Michael Scott, in the
1940s could not do.
With Pretoria increasingly under sustained foreign sanctions, domestic unrest, and a
teetering economy, de Klerk made strides to abolish apartheid soon after he took over the
presidency from Botha in 1990. De Klerk unbanned the anti-apartheid political groups and
released Mandela from prison. However, the apartheid to democracy transition years between
1990 and 1994 saw a level of increased violence as the major players – the ANC, the National
Party, and the IFP – wrestled for political power in the new South Africa.
Once again, Contextual theologians provided a means to save the nation from reverting
back to the dark apartheid years. The 1990 Rustenburg Conference and Rustenburg Declaration
provided for Chikane to meet with DRC lay leaders, and South African business leaders to help
form a committee of representatives from the civil society that all political groups could trust
during the1991 NPC. The subsequent NPA helped set South Africa on the road to creating its
new constitution guaranteeing equal rights and privileges for all South Africans, regardless of
race.
Kuyperian neo-Calvinism theology ended when Contextual Theology came onto the
scene in South Africa. For over a decade Contextual theologians played a crucial role in ending
and guaranteeing the end of apartheid in South Africa by contributing to the political
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radicalization of the churches. Although the Afrikaner powers essentially eliminated all the major
anti-apartheid political leaders from the public arena, and banned their organizations from openly
influencing the population within South Africa by the late 1970s, the churches filled the vacuum.
Contextual Theology, along with the increase of non-white clergy to powerful leadership
positions, brought that much needed activism for the churches and church organizations to
effectively confront and defeat the apartheid system through international calls for sanctions,
street protests, and finally, facilitating the peace process through the transitional years from
apartheid to democracy.
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